W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1990

Britain's Labour Party and the EEC Decision
Marcia Marie Lewandowski
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Eastern European Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Public
Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewandowski, Marcia Marie, "Britain's Labour Party and the EEC Decision" (1990). Dissertations, Theses,
and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625615.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-4w70-3c60

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

BRITAIN'S LABOUR PARTY AND THE EEC DECISION

A Thesis

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and M ary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillm ent
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
M aster of Arts

by
M arcia Lewandowski
1990

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

M aster of Arts

Marcia Marie Lewandowski

Approved, M ay 1990

Alan J. W ard

Donald J. B

Clayton M. Clemens

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOW LEDGEM ENTS

Page
................................................................................. . ..............
iv

A B S T R A C T ..................................................................................................................................

v

IN T R O D U C T IO N ........................................................................................................................

2

C H APTER I. LABOUR’S IDEO LOGY AND FOREIGN PO LIC Y.........................................

4

C H A PTER II. LABOUR'S SOCIALIST OUTLOOK ON TH E E E C .....................................

37

C H A PTE R III. FRO M T H E DEBATE TO TH E R E F E R E N D U M .........................................

62

C O N C L U S IO N .............................................................................................................................

82

B IB L IO G R A P H Y ..........................................................................................................................

85

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

T h e writer wishes to express her appreciation to Dr. Alan W ard, under whose
guidance this analysis was conducted, for his patience and timely advice throughout the
research of this thesis. The author is also indebted to Professors Don Baxter and Clay
C lem ens for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript.

iv

ABSTRACT

T h e purpose of this study is to determ ine w hether the rift that developed
b etw een 1 9 6 4 -1 9 7 5 in Britain's Labour Party over the question of entry into the
European Economic Community can be credited to the traditional ideological differences
that exist within the party.
An assessm ent of Labour’s traditional ideology and foreign policy positions over
tim e revealed that the party's internal divisiveness, particularly the struggle of the
rebellious left-wing for a more "socialist" agenda, was more likely to m anifest itself
when Labour was in Opposition than when the party was in power. The roots of the
party's ideological split w ere reflected in the party's several international outlooks.
Upon examination of the arguments advanced within the party between 1964 and
1975 over the specific party policy on the Common M arket, it was discovered that the
debates w ere primarily ideological in content. But it was a lack of ideological definition
that was at least partially responsible for the split that developed over the issue.
T h e decision to hold a referendum in 1975 was used as a device by Labour
leaders to avoid a vote on E E C entry that could have led to the dismantling of the entire
party. Holding a referendum was the policy that divided the party the least.
Each appraisal leads to the final conclusion that the dissension that broke out
within the party over C om m on M arket entry is not distinctly illustrative of the
traditional ideological split in Britain's Labour Party.

V

BRITAIN'S LABOUR PARTY AND THE DECISION TO ENTER THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION
In 1992,

two of the remaining non-m em ber EEC countries of Western Europe,

Spain and Portugal, will officially enter the European Econom ic Com m unity, thereby
creating

a Single European M arket with an economic power that will be rivaled only by

the United States. Th e decision to join the EEC was certainly one of the most important
and sensitive questions to confront G reat Britain in the 20th century. It also proved to
be no easy choice for a party of the left with a history of ideological problems and
confused, often controversial, foreign policy outlooks. Britain's Labour Party suffers
from the sam e problem s as many other mass "Socialist" parties. In order to be
electorally more appealing, mass parties must be broad-based and must encompass a
wide variety of beliefs and opinions. In the process, the party must often sacrifice unity
and coherence for votes. From the beginning, the Labour Party has been split between
left and right, but for som e reason it seems to have had greater difficulty in maintaining
party unity than have its "Socialist" European counterparts.
T h e failure of the Labour Party to gain office since 1979 in a time of British
econom ic uncertainty and oscillating Conservative popularity, is attributed by many to
the fact that bitter internal disputes over ideologically-based differences continue to
prevent the party from presenting a united front to the British electorate. In order to
understand the present-day implications of the inability of Labour supporters to agree
am ongst them selves, it would be of some value to exam ine Labour's various positions
toward one of the most challenging issues to face the party in its short history, that of
entry into the Com m on M arket, to determ ine if the split that developed in the party
betw een 1 9 6 4 -1 9 7 5 over this issue is a reflection of the traditional ideological split
within the party.
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In o rder to d efine the party's traditional left-right split, an assessm en t of
Labour's traditional ideology and foreign policy will be m ade. This will be followed by an
exam ination of the arguments advanced within the party between 1964 and 1975 over
the specific party policy on the Com m on Market. A final consideration will be given to
the devisive problems that developed prior to, and as a result of,
hold a referendum on the EEC issue.

Labour's decision to

CHAPTER I
LABOUR’S IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

H istorically, the link betw een Labour's ideology and foreign policy has been
inconsistent. This inconsistency is reflected in the party's in-fighting and extrem ely
broad-based attem pts by party leaders to find consensus policies. This is not a new
problem for politicians in Britain. Discrepancies between word and deed in the Labour
Party can be traced as far back as the early

1900's. O ne

can be found in Labour's actions toward Chile

in 1973.

appropriate modern example

In its "Program m e," set out at the annual conference in October 1973, the
Labour Party ren ew ed itself as a "dem ocratic Socialist Party", prepared to follow
socialist principles in bringing about the fulfillment of such socialist goals as economic
and social equality, the elimination of poverty, the workers' ownership of the means of
production, and the achievem ent of full employment. Yet six weeks after the conference,
a newly installed Labour G overnm ent approved the sale of warships to Chile, where the
dem ocratically elected M arxist G overnm ent of S alvador Allende had recently been
overthrow n in a bloody m ilitary coup. Allende's am bassador to Britain had earlier
requested and received Labour's support against Pinochet's military in su rg en cy-th e
very regim e that Britain was presently supplying with arm s. The decision to send
warships to a regime

that had already tortured and killed thousands of Chilean socialists

w as in direct conflict with Labour's ideology and rhetoric. The fact that the Labour Party
historically has not been able, when in office,

to live up to

opposition, reveals much about the

of the radical fringe of the party, and

power

the

commitments itmade in

Labour's prospects for offering a viable alternative to Conservative capitalist policies

4

5

and establishing a new social order.1
Any discussion of a nation's foreign policy must involve a discussion of the ruling
party's ideology, as the two concepts are intricately connected, one usually being a
function of the other. It is necessary to discover why the Labour Party in Britain
appeared to be a notable exception. This paper will attempt to assess Labour's traditional
ideology and its traditional view of foreign policy, and will ask why the party's decisions
have not always been consistent with basic socialist goals in the international arena.

Ideology
It is difficult to point to a specifically Labour Party

ideology due to the lack of

any agreed upon ideological limits within the party. The party rarely feels the need to
parallel its actions in and out of governm ent with any structured theory. Rather, the
Labour

P arty

d evises

specific

policies

to

tackle

specific

problem s,

and

only

occassionally asks theoretical questions.2
T h e Labour Party has contained many minority stands in its history, many of
them remote from

the m ainstream of Labour thinking, so that an attempt to record and

incorporate every minority belief in the party would inevitably be incoherent. It would
confuse the otherw ise relatively clear distinctions betw een right and left within the
party. Nonetheless, the party manifesto is used to rally all the main factions of the party
at election tim es and, because there are so many factions, it must be written in a
sufficiently vague form to satisfy a range of views from left to right.2
C an one identify the fundam ental sim ilarity of ideas which has united the
disparate groups in one political party since 1900? The diverse factions have somehow
been able to find a uniting factor, a factor that could be described as 'labourist'.4
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Labour and the Unions
T h e Labour Party w as established primarily as the political extension of the
trade unions. The party would express such trade union ideals as the protection of a
\

d ecen t standard of living for the workers. The party is financially and politically
d ep en d en t on the unions, but

it is often forced to attack them when in office.5

Nonetheless, as David Coates argues, "The Labour Party was founded in 1900 to pursue
the interests of the unions in the parliamentary sphere, and it cannot escape from this
obligation w ithout threatening its pow er base. The social and political relationship
betw een the Labour Party and the unions is therefore crucial. It is what m akes the
Labour Party a la b o u r party."5 Because it is difficult to translate such trade union
aspirations as shorter hours, higher wages and better working conditions into a theory
of society, it is difficult to pinpoint "labourism" as an elaborated ideology? The clearest
hint can be found in the foundation conference in 1900 that agreed to work for a distinct
Labour group in P arliam en t, one with
willingness

its own whips, an ag reed policy, and a

to cooperate with any party which was engaged in promoting legislation in

the direct interest of labour.
H. M. Drucker defines the term "ideology"--in the case of the Labour Party and
appropriately for this discussion--in much broader term s than is com m on amongst
political scientists. Typically, political scientists and commentators on the Labour Party
such

as

R .T .

P a rlia m e n ta ry

M c K e n z ie
S o c ia lis m

in

B ritish

P o litic a l

P a rtie s

(1 9 6 3 ),

(1 9 6 4 ), and David Coates in The

R.

M iliband

in

Lab o ur Party and ,the

Struggle for Socialism (1 9 7 5 ), have concentrated on what Drucker terms the doctrinal
aspects of

an ideology. These include the description of the party's behaviour "as an
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institution as if it w ere a machine for the creation and propogation of socialist doctrine
and the translation of the doctrine into policy, legislation, and p ractice.”8

D rucker

exp an d s his definition of ideology to include such aspects as traditions, beliefs,
characteristic procedures and feelings which help to anim ate the members of the party.
This dim ension he term s "ethos,"

expressions of which are found in the party's

form ality of practices (em bodied in written, often detailed rules), its dem ands for
sacrifices from its leaders, and its unwillingness to sack its lead ers.9 According to
Drucker, this "ethos" has played a major role in Labour's ideology throughout the years.
Labourism is not exactly an ideology, but it is necessary to look behind the socialist face
worn by the party throughout its history to see it for pure and simple trade union
politics. It was in 1825 that labourism was first presented as a theory.

Labourism
In 1825, Thom as Hodgskins wrote a pamphlet entitled Labour Defended Against
the Claims of Capital that was seen as the manifesto of the emerging labour movement. He
presented labourism as a clear-cut theory and defined it, Foote writes, as "a set of
assumptions governing political motivations of established trade union leaders."10 These
assumptions have survived into the different conditions of the 20th century.
There w ere five articles of labourism, according to Hodgskins, the first being the
belief that the labourers or working people were denied their just share of the nation’s
w ealth. T h e second characteristic, therefore, was a dem and for the redistribution of
wealth to those people who created it. The third was that the workers w ere opposed to
capitalists, the people who would personally profit at the expense of the poor, but not to
capitalism as a social and economic system, as long as profits w ere reinvested in the
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system and distributed equally among the workers. This article is in contrast to Marx
who saw the capitalists them selves, and not the capitalist system, as the enem y. Marx
also criticized Hodgskin for failing to recognize the gross inequalities in the distribution
of w ealth as a result of w age labour. Therefore, according to M arx, labourists were
simply attacking the symptoms, and not the cause of inequality--the disease of wage
la b o u r.n The fourth article of the labourist theory promoted the independence and self
-reliance of workers as a class.This is also different from M arx, who never regarded
trade unions as ends in themselves, as Hodgskins did, and who felt the unions were only
partially effective at b es t.12 In short, the political and economic ideas enum erated by
M arx w e re

fund am en tally opposed to the

labourism

of the

British trade

unions.

Hodgskins final article w as the worker's right over workers from other nations to hold
jobs in Britain .13 These articles were flexible enough to encompass a large number of
different political ideas, yet w ere distinct enough to exclude the Liberal party to the
right and various revolutionary factions on the left, although ideas representative of
both can be found inside the party and compete for party attention and support.

Lab o u ris m —Its

Lim its

T h e core of the Labour Party ideology consists, therefore, of the trade union
politics espoused by Hodgskins in 1825. Its ideological boundaries are broad enough to
absorb and modify ideologies as diverse as militant syndicalism and m oderate liberalism.
D iffe re n t

in terest

groups

c o m p ete

for

d ifferen t

policies

within

this

ideological

fram ew ork, and different political theories evolve. If one of the diverse groups within
Labour's boundaries assum es a position that goes against the dom inant trade union
section of the party, however, it risks cutting itself off from the mainstream of Labour
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thinking. If the ideological faction wishes to have consistent success, it will adapt itself
to the labourism of the trade u n io n s .1 4 Geoffrey Foote argues, "Labour tends to be more
compatible with gradual and piecem eal solutions to problems than it is with radical and
fundam ental solutions. The socialist ideology which Labour had accepted since 1918 has
generally been interpreted in a gradualist m a n n e r ." i5 Thus, Labour’s ideological limits,
though flexible, are capable of making a distinction between the left and right in the
political

spectrum . T h e

party

is often

ideologically

likened

to

a "broad church"

incorporating diverse ideas, but not so broad as to incorporate the revolutionary left or
reactio n ary

right.

Labour's Ideology in this Century
The Reform Bill of 1867 increased the number of voters in the working classes
in G reat Britain, but it w as not until later in the century that the Labour Party began to
take shape under the leadership of such groups as the Fabian Society and the Independent
Labour

P a rty

(IL P ),

cu lm in atin g

in

1900,

with

the

form ation

of

a

Labour

Representation Com m ittee which included representatives of socialist groups and trade
unions.
David Coates argues that the Labour Party had never been a socialist party in the
'continental' or 'Marxist' sense, but only a social dem ocratic party, at least as that term
cam e to be understood, following the split in the international working class movement
brought about by the Russian Revolution. Coates maintains that the meaning of the term
'social d em o crat' is closely tied with the developm ent of the international labour
m ovem ent. As Russia and W estern Europe industrialized after 1870, working class
parties em erged which subscribed to some variant of Marxist philosophy. They came.
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together in what w as known as the Second International, which in the late 1890's met
regularly to discuss socialist tactics and strategies.16
This Second International identified itself as a social democratic organization, yet
the British Labour Party had only a tenuous connection with it through the Independent
Labour Party. Coates suggests that this is a reason for the Labour Party being 'different'
from ’continental' and 'Marxist' working class parties. The Second International split
under the im pact of the W W I and the Russian

R evolution.

A third Com m unist

International, m ade up of national communist parties loyal to Moscow, emerged, as did a
Social D em ocratic International, m ade up of parties seeking socialist change through
constitutional channels. C oates states that the Labour Party has always subscribed to,
and operated within, the theory and practice of the post-1919 social democratic Labour
and Socialist International, of which, from the beginning, it was a leading m em ber.17
After the war, the party openly declared itself in favor of socialism. From this basis, the
idea of democratic socialism developed.
In his theory of dem ocratic socialism, R.H. Taw ney argues that the criterion of
social function ought to be more important than that of wealth, because the application of
function is based on service, rather than on the privilege and power which accumultes
from the dep en d en ce on profit.18 In short, dem ocratic socialism seeks to transform
society through denying privilege for its own sake, and is based on the abhorrence of the
poor quality of life brought about by capitalism.
T h e m ainstream

ideology of the party w as firmly established by the early

1920's. It consisted of, Ian Taylor argues, "a gradualist, collectivist-based reformist
type of socialism in which the State was the main agent of social and economic change."19
Fabians, such as Sidney W ebb, favored such a scheme of gradualness. They believed that
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their opponents failed to grasp the inevitability of this non-revolutionary approach,
which has not only reflected the development of the party's mainstream ideology to date,
but has also to this day

symbolized the impact of Fabianism on the Labour Party.20

Sidney and Beatrice W ebb, in their book A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth
of

G re a t

Britain

(1st e d .,1 9 2 0 ),

stated

that the first step

in achieving

political

dem ocracy is to sort out the issues and to establish the Com m on Will of the people
through the reformation of Britain's institutions. According to them , the people of their
generation owed an im m ense debt of gratitude "to the political thinkers, leaders and
p arties

w ho

h av e,

during

the

last

ninety

y e ars,

carried

through

the

a ra d u a

dem ocratisation of our c o m m u n ity ."21 The writings of many leading politicians as well
as

several

m ainstream

p arty

docu m en ts

reflected

this

ideology.

Throughout the

ideology, disproportionately influenced by Fabianism ,

'20's,

the

advocated the

creation of a socialist society step-by-step. In order to ensure the passage of its
program, the party's first goal was to gain a majority of seats in the House of Commons.
O nce this goal w as attained, the party could begin, legislatively, to im plem ent its
policies of state control and ownership of the means of production and the provision of a
wide range of social services. State ownerhip and control reflected the Fabian influence,
and indicated that the form that public ownership was likely to take would be State and
m unicipal,

not participatory control by the w orkers them selves

as advocated

by

M arxists.22 With the dom inance ot Fabianism, the limited objectives of M .P.'s and trade
unionists, and the lack of a revolutionary left-wing intellectual group, deviations from
the m ainstream ideology w ere u n lik e ly .2 3
In the 1920's there w as a consistency

between the Labour Party's ideological

stance and its policies. For exam ple, as noted earlier, radical deviations from the
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m ainstream w ere unlikely. T h erefore, when the British Com m unist Party requested
affiliation with the Labour Party in the 1920's, it was turned down. But until it gained a
substantial majority in the Commons, it would be impossible for the Party to advance its
socialist a g e n d a .24 In 1924, Ram say M acDonald formed the first Labour Governm ent.
But as the Party rem ained dependent on Liberal votes for its majority in the House of
Com m ons it had little chance to implement independent policies. By 1931, MacDonald,
along with several other Labour M .P .'s, abandoned the party to form the "National"
governm ent with the Conservative Party, in order to combat the deepening depression.
T h e National G overnm ent proved to be incompetent and self-defeating, and MacDonald
resigned as Prime M inister in 1935.
During the 1930's, opposition and dissent within the party increased, giving the
leaders a chance to define the party’s intentions in several documents, policy statements,
and pam phlets. T h e 1930's

w ere important with regard to the relationship between

ideology and policy. M any socialist principles w ere re-em phasized. It was stressed that
"a Labour G overnm ent should plan in future through economic controls, nationalisation
of basic industries and services, extension of the social services and the promotion of
international c o o p e ra tio n ." ^ The policies that eventually em erged reflected a mixed
version

of the broadly interpreted trade

union

"labourism" and the revolutionary

socialism of Marxism. Nevertheless, Fabianism (or moderate socialism, where the State
is seen as being fundamentally neutral) remained the dominant strand in the mainstream
id e o lo g y .26

M em bers of this group included Hugh Dalton, C lem ent A tlee, Herbert

Morrison and G .D .H . Cole.
In view of the difficulties that the first minority Labour governm ent faced, the
Labour Party of the 1930's thought it best to set-out specific guidelines, objectives, and
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priorities that would exclude the possibilities of coalition government, but would not be
"left-w ing” enough to antagonize the m oderates am ong potential Labour vo ters.27
Following World W ar II, the mainstream ideology of the Labour Party cam e under three
successive challenges; from the revisionists on the right, the Bennites on the left, and in
the 1970's from the corporatists.

R evisio n ists
It w as

during

the

prosperous

years

of the

1950's

and

196 0 's

that

the

Revisionists cam e to the forefront of the Labour Party. Their main goal w as to redefine
British

socialism

with

som e

revisionists

wishing

to

b re a k

aw ay

from

Labour

com pletely. Ian Taylor records that, "Labour's defeat in the 1959 G eneral Election was
the

precursor to a

short period

of paranoia

during

which

the

conflict betw een

revisionism and m ainstream traditionalism reached its p e a k ." 2 8 Although revisionists
like Anthony Crosland challenged the relevance of such traditional objectives as Clause 4
of Labour's constitution (which com m itted the party to public ow nership), it did not
lead to any significant changes in ideology or policy. It m erely blurred the lines of
distinction betw een the right and left groups in the party, making it more difficult to
identify

the

m ainstream

ideology.

It w as

not a m arked deviation

from

Labour's

traditional dem ocratic socialism, but it did challenge traditional ways of doing things in
the party,

particularly the power of trade union leaders in the party.29 G eoffrey Foote

argues,
T h e revisionist challenge culm inated in the technocratic, class-neutral
ideology of the Wilson era, but the strains this led to with the Unions at a
tim e of increasing econom ic recession resulted in the d e fe a t of
re visio n is m . As an ideology m ore suited to prosperity and full
em ploym ent, revisionism seem ed out of date and irrelevant to Labour in
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the new conditions of the 1970's.30
The trade union leaders, now moved somewhat to the left in the party, reasserted
them selves in the 1970's, prompting a new challenge from revisionists on the right
which evolved into a new ideological variant, social dem ocracy, and resulted in the
defection of four highly respected Labour leaders in 1980 to form the Social Democratic
Party (S D P ).

The Left
The Keep Left movement of the 1940's was the first organized challenge to the
Labour leadership by a group that was commited to public ownership. This movement
particularly tried to persuade the leaders to pursue an independent international role
for Britain, but w as unsuccessful.31 However, the leftists gained momentum in 1951
w hen

th re e

Labour

M inisters

resigned

o ver

G a its k e ll’s decision

to

charge

for

prescriptions under the National Health Service. The ministers felt that Gaitskell and
others who had supported the decision w ere sacrificing a basic socialist principle, that
health care should be provided equally to all, regardless of ability to pay. A second major
victory w as the 1959 decision at the annual conference to support unilateral nuclear
disarm am ent.
Anthony W edgewood Benn em erged in the 1960's and early 1970’s as a politician
of considerable influence on the left. In his book T h e N ew Politics (1970) he argues for
a review of various issues arising from the technical and industrial changes of the
1 9 6 0 ’s, and for a m ove tow ard more open governm ent.

He w as instrum ental in

channelling the leftist ag e n d a into the party policy in the early
exam ples of Benn's influence

1 9 8 0 's .32 S o m e

can be found in the annual conferences in the 1970's and

early 1980's, when the party commited itself to the nationalisation of land, insurance,
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and banking, as well as the abolition of private schools, and unilateral

nuclear

d isarm am ent. Benn continues to contest elections for the party leadership today. In
addition to Benn, corporate socialism becam e increasingly popular within the Labour
Party during the 1970's.

Corporate

Socialism

According to Henry Drucker, corporate socialists believe that "socialism cannot
be understood as any particular policy or doctrine but, rather, as w hatever policies the
T U C leadership and Labour Cabinet agree are in the national interest at the moment."33
In effect, during the 1970's, public policy was the result of agreem ents between the
governm ent and the unions, an arrangement which collapsed in the labour strikes of the
so-called "winter of discontent," which brought about the collapse of the Labour
governm ent of Jam es Callaghan in 1979. This type of socialism is primarily procedural
in that it has no clear goals other than to protect a decent standard o f living for all
working class people. This view does not advocate the necessity for large levels of
nationalisation or public expenditure. It is in this way that corporate socialism differs
from labourism. Th e labourists main concern is the economic security of the working
class and the redistribution of wealth as determ ined by the workers them selves. These
concerns

m anifested th em selves m ainly through the view s of the union leaders.

C orporate socialism, on the other hand, is simply a w ay of thinking about how and by
w hom decisions are m a d e -th ro u g h

agreem ents m ade betw een

representatives of

Britains two largest "corporations," the General Council of the T U C and the Labour Party
leadership. It can be said that one of the reasons why the unions were not adverse to this
"corporatist" method of combating economic recession was because they saw such an
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arra n g e m e n t as a w ay of increasing their bargaining p o w er.34 This becam e the
operating principle of the party during its period in office in the 1 9 7 0 ’s, and is quite
similar to the position held by the Labour Party before 1914.
Foote argues "Labourism --its flexibility and limits--is the key to the variety of
political ideas adopted by Labour in the last eighty years. The ability of new ideologies to
fit into the labourist fram ew ork determ ines their chance of political success in the
p a rty ."33 Despite the diversity of ideas so evident in the party, continuity has been
m aintained, mainly due to the strong link between the party and the unions which is the
essence of labourism. M any members in the party would prefer to w eaken that link, and
have attem pted to do so, but so far have been relatively unsuccessful. This continuity has
been periodically shaken by attem pts to rem ove C lause 4 from the Labour Party
C o n s titu tio n -w h ic h com m its the party to the public

ow nership of the m eans of

p ro d u c tio n -a cornerstone of traditional British socialism . M ore generally, the core
consensus has been challenged from the left (more nationalisation, socialism, etc.) and
the right (less socialism, elim inate Clause 4).
In sum , the schools of thought within the Labour Party since its inception
included the radical "Socialists” on the left, the labourists, Fabians and^ corporatists
each as the m ainstream of thought at one time, and the social democrats on the right.
Som e of these ideological conflicts can be identified in the party's

controversies over

foreign policy.

Foreign

Policy

Throughout the

Labour Party's history, questions concerning

foreign policy

matters have been dealt with by the party in different ways. Each decade has seen the lefl
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wing of the party struggling to gain control of the initiative in determining the party’s
program m e. M any m em bers of the party's leadership, including several devout left
wingers, played vital roles in the foreign policy process in the post-W orld W ar I years-in a period which w itnessed Britain's transformation from the world's econom ic and
military hegem on into a nation with grave economic and social difficulties, heavily
dependent on the United S tates for its national security. It would be most productive to
exam ine Labour's foreign policy decisions during periods of internal disunity and tumuli
-occurring usually w hile in O p p o s itio n -in

order to accurately assess the resulting

party program m e for action.

The History of Leftist Challenges: 1930's and 1940's
Th e Labour Party was divided on foreign policy as early as W orld W ar I when it
split on w hether to support the war.

There were at least three elem ents.; the pacifists,

the international socialists who argued that the international working class should stop
the w ar by refusing to participate, and the "traditionalists" who supported the wartime
coalition governm ent.
Politics in Britain during the 1 9 3 0 ’s was characterized by the rigid adherence
to

party alignm ents by both parties. Despite the mounting threat in Europe, members

felt that it w as undesirable to challenge parliam entary policies or the policies of the
party m achines. In January of 1937, how ever, the m em bers of the party left-wing
grew frustrated with com pliance, and decided it was time to put an end to party loyalty
taking precedence over all other matters. Therefore, following what was to them a very
frustrating and ineffectual Party Conference at

Edinburgh, the leftists joined together

and launched what becam e known as the Unity Campaign.

Stafford Cripps, the leader of
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the cam paign, began talks with the Socialist League, the Independent Labour Party
(IL P ), and the Com m unist Party in an attem pt to unite the groups which he felt,
together, could gain a greater voice and more representation in Parliament for members
of the working class. Although this proved difficult at first, due to long-standing
suspicion and lack of trust between the groups, common ground was eventually found to
exist, with all the groups fiercely opposing the Governm ent's rearm am ent programme,
its foreign policy position of non-intervention in Europe, and most importantly, the
"betrayal" of S ocialism

in Spain

by a British

governm ent that w as

unwilling

to

intervene on behalf of the loyalists who were fighting Franco and fascism . The project
w as pushed forward by William Mellor and Aneurin Bevan. The campaign was presented
as "one 'to revitalize the activity and transform the policy of the Labour movement'; to
seek, as the cam paign manifesto said, 'Unity within the framework of the Labour party
and the trade unions'."36
No one protested m ore forcibly than Aneurin Bevan that the G o vernm ent’s
rearm am ent program m e should be opposed and the resources reallocated to domestic
programs. The period w as one of social unrest and anger in the economically distressed
areas of the U.K.. M arches and demonstrations were becoming

frequent and emotional.

B evan, whose goal in the '30's was to bridge the gap between the politics of the people
and the politics at W estm inster, put
a ttac ked

the

Labour

P arty

his great skill as an orator to use, and verbally

E xecutive

for

their

inaction

and

subm ission

to

the

Conservative Government.
W hen the Spanish Civil W a r began in July of 1936, the Labour Executive's
official position towards Spain was one of non-intervention. Although non-intervention
w as a poor alternative at best, they felt that to support involvement in Spain outright

would increase the difficulties of the non-interventionist Socialist Blum G overnm ent in
France, and most likely bring about its collapse.
According to Ralph M iliband, there w ere no few er than four positions with
regard to rearm am en t within the Labour m ovem ent in 1936. Th e first view was the
straightforward pacifist view . Th e second, which was still the majority view , w as "a
b elief in Labour's traditional program m e of disarm am ent by international agreem ent
coupled with an increasingly inconsistent acceptance of the obligation of collective action
in defence of Labour's principles, and support for the League of Nations."37 The third
view , of which Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton w ere the main proponents, held that
Labour had no choice but to support British rearm am ent. The fourth view was that of the
Labour left. This view , the most "ideological" of the four, dem anded resistance to Fascist
aggression but refused to support the government's programme on the ground that the
governm ent could not be trusted to use arms for anything but its own reactionary
p u rp o s e s .38

The resolution presented by the National Executive at the 1936 Labour

Party Conference was one of uneasy compromise between the second and third views. The
L abour

P arty's

policy

w as

to

m aintain

its

d e fe n c e

forces

in

accord

with

its

responsibilities as a m em ber of the League of Nations, to protect the people's rights and
liberties, the continuance of dem ocratic institutions, and the observance of International
Law 3 9 How ever, the party did reserve the right, based on the incompetence and dismal
record of the governm ent, to disclaim any responsibility for a competitive rearm am ent
policy.
In early 193 7, Hugh Dalton, the Chairm an of the Executive, and Ernest Bevin,
then Chairm an of the T U C , refused to move for a new policy towards Spain, where
dem ocracy w as fighting for survival, and they

supported the governm ent's

active
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rearm am ent and recruiting program m e that year. Bevan and the leftists, however,
becam e increasingly hostile to the

goverment, believing that it could not be trusted to

use arm am ents in the international interests of the working-class,

or of peace.4*) Party

biographers and autobiographers have since argued that, after a brief period of
indecision at the Edinburgh conference in 1937, the Labour Party leaders, recognizing
that non-intervention w as hypocritical, set about rallying the nation in support of the
Spanish Republic as an exam ple of resistence to the Fascist onslaught in Europe.4-! In
truth, it w as the leftists who exposed the pitfalls of a non-interventionist policy.
Ernest Bevin w as portrayed as the leader of this crusade, when in reality it was known
that he had vigorously defended the continuance of non-intervention in articles he had
written for the Daily

Herald.

Such contradictions increased the bitterness of the

internal party dispute.
At the time, Hugh Dalton felt that valid judgements about the situation in Europe
w ere impossible to m ake without precise information, and he was outraged by Bevan's
assault on the considered views and reservations of the Labour leadership. But to Bevan
and the majority of the rank and file of the party, a world crisis was imminent. He held
that the party was unacceptably constrained by the unifying edict of the Edinburgh
C onference, which forbade any association with Communists. This edict was invoked to
subdue the Unity C am paign. Th e opposition began to line up. Cripps, Bevan, William
M ellor, G eo rg e Strauss, H arold Laski, and other principal signatories of the Unity
Manifesto began organizing mass meetings on a scale larger than anything seen in years.
Cripps spoke out in Fabian Society lectures against the Governm ent's rearm am ent
policy, characterizing it as policy by the privileged few to protect their interests while
rallying the poor workers to support their cause through empty promises of improved
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industrial conditions and more em ploym ent through mobilisation.42
B e v an ,

w ho

w as

c e rtain ly

no

pacifist,

continued

his

criticism s

of

the

G overnm ent. His prim ary com plaint against the LabourParty leaders w as that they
pitched

th eir criticism s

p a rliam en tary decisions.

too

m odestly;

the

It should take

Party

had

too

much

into account all view s

revere nc e

by allowing

for

more

outspokeness by factions and extremists, and by having party members voice their own
as well as the party's concerns, com plaints, and criticisms.

But as a result of the

Edinburgh Conference, which had forbidden any association with not only Communists,
but also with sym pathizers outside the Com m unist Party, D alton, Bevin, and the
Executive crushed the leftist rebellion by disaffiliating the Socialist League from the
P a rty .43 At its Whitsun Conference in Leicester, the Executive delivered the ultimatum
to the Socialist L e a g u e -e ith e r end the Unity Cam paign or be expelled from the Party.
Th e

Leag u e chose to dissolve, and

the "Left" found itself without any effective

organization within the party to challenge a united Executive. The Cam paign for Unity
would be perm itted to continue within the party, with a com m ittee composed only of
Labour m em bers, but with m any of its most dedicated supporters now excluded.
The Executive scored another victory at the Bournemouth Annual Conference in
1937, receiving decisive support for its international and defence policies, and the Left
suffered another blow in July of that year when Hugh Dalton succeeded in altering the
PLP's attitude on the Defence Estimates, by persuading the Party not to vote against the
provision

of arm s

to

the

F re n c h .44

But the Left did secure one victory at the

Bournemouth C onference, the unanimous denunciation of the policy of non-intervention
in S pain, along with a resolution supporting the Spanish Republic. Oddly enough, both
the right and left found the decisions at Bournemouth agreeable. The Conference marked a
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new stage of hope in the struggle for working-class unity.
B evan's ideological views determ ined his outlook on foreign policy and also
defined the leftist position towards international policy prior to the war. He proposed a
quite different course of action from the old doctrine of surrendering party principles
for party unity. He m aintained:
W e should conduct throughout the country such a campaign against the
National G overnm ent, against its arm am ent program m e and against its
foreign policy, as will m ake our position clear; we should say to the
country w e are prepared to m ake w hatever sacrifices are necessary, to
give w hatever aims are necessary in order to fight fascist powers and in
order to consolidate world peace, but we are not going to put the sword in
the hands of our enem ies that may be used to cut off our own heads. There
is no other way in which the movement can save its s o u l46
According to Bevan, it was impossible to deny the Government the right to govern
until its Labour opponents were themselves strong enough to form a Government. Should
this happen, the left wing of the party would be prepared to provide w hatever support
necessary to carry out a Socialist international policy, but he and his supporters were
not willing
from
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to tie the m ovem ent to a coalition, a National Government which held office
to 1 9 3 7 , which they felt would betray their policies.46

T h erefo re,

for

Bevan, the main argum ent w as not over the specific issue of rearm am ent, but the
political strategy on the Left in the th irtie s 47
B evan 's opportunity

n ever cam e

in the

193 0 's

because

the

C onservative

governm ent of Neville C ham berlain succeeded the conservative-dom inated National
G overnm ent in 1937. The Conservatives took the country into World W ar II and Labour,
opposed only by a small number of its pacifist members, fully supported the war effort,
joining with the C onservatives in Churchill's coalition governm ent from M ay 1940.
In the post-W orld W a r II years, according to Jam es C allagh an, the Labour
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governm ent's European policy cam e under two criticisms within the Labour Party. The
first cam e from the Keep Left Group, which criticised Britain's foreign policy as too pro
A m erican, and argued that it was the unaccommodating western attitude towards the
S oviet Union that had caused the rift betw een the form er w artim e allies. Early in
N ovem ber 1 9 4 5 , 100 Labour M .P.'s abstained in a vote on foreign policy for similar
reasons. This criticism w eaken ed after the M arshall Plan w as im plem ented, bringing
American economic aid to rebuild a shattered Europe.48
The second criticism was that Britain had thrown away the golden opportunity to
take

the

lead

in restructuring

Europe.

But following

the

w ar,

Britain's financial

problems w ere so severe that not only was Labour's economic programme dam aged, but
w artim e rationing w as continued into the next d ecad e.
concentrated

In the 1 9 4 0 ’s, the British

on rebuilding their shattered economy. They also had commitments to the

British C o m m onw ealth, along with other responsibilities, including the problem s in
Palestine, to occupy them . Britain would assist Europe, but from the outside, as junior
partner with the U .S .. Ernest Bevin, then Foreign Secretary, believed that the United
States was W estern Europe's only possible source of defence and economic support, given
the Soviets great fe ar of G erm any, their belief that the W est would invade Eastern
Europe, and their assumption that there must always be antagonism between communist
and capitalists nations.

Although Bevin desired good relations with Russia, he believed

that the Soviets would accept no grey area--if a country w as not marching towards
com m unism , then it was capitalist.49

19 5 0 ' s - 1960's
As a result of the economic devastation of Europe, there em erged in the late
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1940's a group of idealists who wished to establish a European Federal Union. They
believed that the basic issues of all European nations should be decided by a supra
n atio n al

g o v e rn m e n t.50 Although

Britain did cooperate in the first of the idealists'

organizations, the Council of Europe, she

was unprepared to accept any other plans for

European integration. She had just em erged, w eak but victorious, from the war, and
could not quite escape from the traditional goals of British foreign policy:

to safeguard

her connections with her colonies, oppose the unification of Europe under a hostile
power, and

maintain a position of strength towards her largest challengers in Europe.

T h erefo re, it w as believed by the leaders of both major parties that membership in
integrated European institutions would conflict with Britain's foreign policy objectives
and interests.51 From 1945 to 1951, Labour was in power, and there was little, if any,
dissent heard from within the party on the subject of European integration.
The Schum an Plan of 1951 proposed the creation of a European coal and steel
community (E C S C ). There w as a split at the plan's very inception between the so-called
'federalists', such as France and Germ any, who favored one supranational governing body
for members of the community as a whole, and those who favored the functional approach
through the creation of

several 'specialised authorities' for the m em ber nations with

much more limited powers. These specialised authorities would be "established by means
of industrial and other across-border activities."52 Jam es Callaghan and Ernest Bevin,
who w ere 'functionalists', felt that the Schum an Plan would be an appropriate project
and

urged Britain to take part in the negotiations to establish the community. But there

w ere two serious objections. First, the Labour governm ent had just recently em erged
victorious in their struggle to nationalise the basic industries of electricity, gas, coal
and steel, and w ere not about to delegate their new-found authority to an international
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body. Second, Jean Monnet, the true author of the Plan, wanted to bind the French and
G erm an coal and steel industries because of his fear that the Germ an industries would
becom e more efficient and would grow faster than the French industries. His primary
concern

w as

to

inhibit

a

G erm an

m ilitary

revival

and

he

enco u rag ed

Britain's

m em bership only if it would accept the federal concept, which neither Labour nor the
Conservatives w o u ld .5 3
Another

argum ent broke out in Europe between the 'maximalists'; who favored

the establishm ent of a coal and steel community only if Britain and Scandanavia would
participate and agree to federalism , and the 'regionalists' who w ere ready to proceed
with only

a lim ited

re g io n alists

th a t

num ber of countries.

th eir

going

ahead

with

British
the

lead ers
plan

m ade

w ithout

it known
Britain

to the

w ould

be

understandable, because federation would not be acceptable to them or Scandinavia, but
most in the Labour Governm ent felt that the discussion of the establishment of functional
specialised authorities in which Britain could take part would be more useful.54
Another integrating m easure, that of a European Army, was proposed by France
as a protective action against a possible G erm an revival. The United States wanted to
incorporate W est G erm any into N A TO and France did not want to cope with the possibility
of a new G erm an army becoming a m enace through rearm am ent. The French proposal
w as to "set up a European Defence Community (ED C ) as a means of integrating a German
contingent into a combined Armed Force at the level of the smallest possible unit, so as to
achieve a com plete m erger under a single military and political authority."55 It was to
be known simply as the European Army. The Labour Government was lobbied hard by the
U nited

S ta te 's

Em bassy,

but its m em bers

b elieved

a

European

Army would be

impractical for either a Labour or Conservative Governm ent. At the time, the issue of a
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European Defence Community was being discussed as an entity that would fall under the
direction ot the Council of Europe. The Cabinet informed the rank and file that they need
not oppose the principle of having a European Army, but should oppose it on the grounds
that the subject of defence w as excluded from the European Assembly's powers in the
Statute of the Council of Europe.56
Following the Labour Party's defeat in the general election of October 1951, the
National Executive Committee (N EC ) of the Party becam e more am enable to the idea of a
European D efence Community, beginning to see it as the best way of reintegrating a
rearm ed , peaceful G erm an y into Europe. As it turned out, the European Defence
C o m m u n ity

w as

killed

by

the

French

A ssem bly

itself

in

1954,

with

both

the

Communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right voting against the treaty.
As is the case with any political party, a series of defeats, particularly defeats of
a m agnitude which the Labour Party suffered during the 1950's, is likely to breed
rebellions against the leadership of the party among politicians starved of office and
power. How ever, not all of Labour's difficulties could be attributed to electoral failures.
By the 1950's the party could no longer evade the "ideological" dilem m a which every
S ocial D em o cratic party had to face in the post-w ar p erio d .57 According to R .T.
M cK enzie, the reality of the issue was this:

C an a Socialist party accept, as permanent, a mixed economy and content
itself with controlling and planning that econom y, and with introducing
further social legislation designed to increase "social justice" and "social
equality"? O r must any Socialist party press on, stage by stage, until it
has achieved a society "based on the common ownership of the means of
production, distribution and exchange" (declared aim of the Labour Party
C o n s titu tio n )? 58

This d eb ate w as illustrated in Britain during the early 1950's by the bitter personal
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battle that took place between Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan for the succession to
Clem ent Atlee. The main foreign policy issue of dispute was whether a party of the left
could advocate full m embership in collective defence pacts (i.e. NA TO ) which were based
on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and which involved both the rearmam ent of
W estern G erm any and the presence of American bases in B rita in .5 9
Each

of the

rivals, in M cK enzie's view , b ecam e

"the spokesm en

for the

conflicting views within the party, both on the nature of Socialism and on the defence and
foreign policies which the Labour Party should adopt."60 The centre and right-wing
elem ents, including a majority of the Parliam entary Party, sided with Gaitskell who
consistently defeated the Bevanite faction.
The Parliam entary leadership cam e closest to defeat on the issue of rearmam ent
of G erm any at the 1954 Party Conference, but although the Left m anaged to rally more
support on Germ an rearm am ent than on any comparable issue for a generation, Gaitskell
and his supporters w ere able to pull out a victory by a very slim margin.
By 1956, the Left had gained even more ground. The new head of the large
Transport and G en eral W orkers Union, Frank Cousins, stood well to the left of his
predecessors, Deakin and Ernest Bevin. It was around this time that almost all of the
seven "constituency" seats on the N E C were snatched by rebel M .P.'s who supported
Bevan, both in his bid for the leadership and in his cam paign to swing the party to the
left. M c K en zie

m aintains that in foreign affairs, "Labour rem ained throughout the

1950's firmly com m itted to collective security and to the British retention of nuclear
w eapons until general disarm am ent w as achieved. But the policies advocated by the
Parliam entary leaders w ere continually disputed in one organ or another of the Party

o rg a n iza tio n ."61
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By the late 1950's the party, still in opposition, w as torn--left to rig h t-o n
the issue of unilateral disarm am ent. In the four years following the 1956 Conference,
the Labour leadership m ade no major concessions to the militant Left within the party,
but prior to the 1959 election, a surprising reversal took place. Almost all of the rebels
who had fought most bitterly in the past against Gaitskell, now m ade their peace with
him and cam paigned loyally by his side during the 1959 election. The most astounding of
these converts was Anuerin Bevan. At the Labour Party Conference in Brighton in 1957,
Bevan w ent so far as to play a leading role in defeating a call for a policy of unilateral
nuclear disarm am ent. M cK enzie offers two reasons for this sudden reversal. The first
explanation is that even the most ideologically preoccupied members of the party could
not fail to ignore the voters primary concern with choosing the best "team" to form a
G overnm ent. If the party could not desist from internal conflict, the "team" image would
be destroyed and there would be few prospects for electoral victory. The second reason
w as the lure of M inisterial posts, to be appointed by Gaitskell as rew ard to his
supporters should Labour return to p o w e r.6 2
W ith Bevan at his side as a firm opponent of unilateral diarm am ent, Gaitskell’s
next challenge cam e unexpectedly from Frank Cousins and the unions, following a vote to
support unilateralism at a M ay 1959 Annual Conference of the G eneral and Municipal
W orkers Union (G M W U ). T h ere was no great fear at that time that the party policy
would be overthrown in favor of unilateralism , but the new spapers exaggerated the
conflict into a personal contest between Gaitskell and Cousins. Once again the old process
of policy decision-m aking within the party was in disarray, with the inevitable outcome
that Labour w as presented to the electorate as a party badly split on an issue of
international im portance.
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Later in 1959, instead of following the Conservative exam ple and re-examining
Labour's party organization, Gaitskell launched an attack on Clause 4 of the Labour
Party Constitution which pledged the party to work for the common ownership of the
m eans of production, distribution and exchange. Although the most specific of all pledges
in the Constitution, C lause 4 was, according to Gaitskell, an electoral liability. He was
dealt the first of two defeats the day after the Party Conference in 1960, when the NEC
decided not to proceed with the am endm ents or additions to Clause 4 which he had
re co m m e n d e d .

G aitskell's

other d e fe a t cam e

at the

19 6 0

Party

C o n feren ce

in

Scarborough, when the Conference decided to adopt both the T G W U and the Engineer's
resolutions

in favo r of a policy of unilateral diarm am en t.

D espite

the efforts of

representatives of the PLP, the N EC, and the Trade Union Congress to produce a new and
viable joint defence statem ent (which included Britain as a supporter of NA TO but not as
an independent nuclear pow er), the unilateralists em erged victorious, but by a very
slim m arg in .63
G aitskell im m ediately set out to campaign for a reversal of this decision. He
m obilized his support through an organization called the C am paign for Dem ocratic
Socialism

(C D S ) which w orked to secure the d efeat of unilateralists in local party

elections and also to win local support for the cam paign to reverse the Scarborough
decision. A very bitter internal party struggle ensued. The unilateralists launched their
own cam paign during 1 96 0 -6 1 . Gaitskell and his followers attem pted to convince key
unions that they should throw their support behind the Parliam entary leadership. It was
an appeal to "save the Party," to which certain unions eventually responded. Thus, the
1961 Annual C onference reversed itself on unilateralism. The ease with which the C D S
recaptured the support of the unionists suggests that the Labour party organization can
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be m anipulated by a few political activists, whether of the right, centre, or left.64
Th e struggle betw een Bevan and Gaitskell was representative of two conflicting
views of t i l l future of dem ocratic socialism. Such struggles can be witnessed in every
other socialist party in the dem ocratic world, but what was unique in the experience of
Britain's Labour Party w as the apparent inability of the Party either to stem or resolve
its ideological conflicts. "This," according to M cKenzie, "almost certainly was the direct
consequence of the party's unique constitutional arrangem ents with the almost unlimited
opportunity they provide for the perpetuation of internal party disputes."65
During the Party C onference in October of 1962, G aitskell consolidated his
pow er in the party in w hat was to be his greatest and final speech, when he all but
comm itted the party to outright opposition to Britain's entry into the Common M arket on
any terms, to the delight of his old enemies on the Left.

1st Application to the Common Market
It is often noted by scholars that in the case of m embership of other integrated
European institutions, such as the European Economic Com m unity (E E C ), Britain's
entry w as precluded by its outlook on foreign affairs. For Britain to have accepted the
R om e Treaty and joined the Com m on M arket in 1961, a fundam ental shift in policy
w ould h ave

had to occurred. Britain was very tentative tow ard further efforts at

European integration, and wished to avoid the creation of new institutions that might
duplicate the work already done by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(O E E C ).
Until 1961, Britain refused to consider Common M arket m em bership because it
w as incom patible with the more important com m itm ents to the C om m onw ealth. On
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N ovem ber 26, 1956, in a House of Commons debate, Harold Macmillan, as Chancellor of
the Exchequer of the Conservative Government, suggested that entry into the EEC would
m ean

sa crific in g

th e

p re fe re n tia l

tre a tm e n t

B ritain

w as

receivin g

from

Com m onw ealth nations. This protectionist attitude was echoed by the Labour Party,

the
in

direct contrast with what would be expected from the party. Its rhetoric would have led
one to believe that Labour would be in favor of breaking down barriers to trade. The
refusal to consider Common M arket membership is also ironic considering the fact that
the Com m onwealth nations no longer accepted Britain's leadership and did not all support
Britain during the S u ez crisis of 1 9 5 6 .66

B rita in -L a b o u r

or

C o n s e rv a tiv e -w a s ,

Pfaltzgraff argues, "unwilling to participate in an integrative schem e which em bodied
the institutional arrangem ents of the E E C . Britain was not prepared to adapt her social,
econom ic, and agricultural policies to those envisaged by the S ix ." 6 7 y e t by May of
196 7 , Harold W ilson, as Prime M inister and as an experienced parliam entarian who
had played a leading role in the Party's civil wars for over a decade, led the Labour
Governm ent to apply for m embership in the European Ecomonic Community.

Impact of Leftist Challenges
The impact of the left on the foreign policy decisions of the Labour Party has been
varied. Most m oderates, or those who constitute the bulk of the party, would say that the
leftists, in pursuing their radical ideals, have caused internal divisiveness in the party
which has resulted in electoral defeat. In governm ent, particularly from 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 1 ,
there w as little dissent heard from within the party.

I think it would be correct to say

that the foreign policy decisions of the Labour Party w ere an am algam ation of the
com peting factions within the party, and as such, w ere much less controversial when
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m ade in office,

when there is a need to satisfy the great majority of views within the

Party. At least until the debate erupted over a proposed referendum on the EEC issue
during Wilson's second period as Prime Minister, the policies that eventually em erged
w ere "watered down". In contrast, party mem bers w ere permitted to speak out much
more freely while in opposition, when the fear of losing electoral support is at its
lowest. T h e g reatest period of controversy in the m ature Labour Party was in the
1930's when it w as in opposition. This assessm ent leads to the conclusion that the
Labour p arty's

in tern atio n al

policies

are

illustrative

of the

roots of the

Party's

ideological division. N ext, I will exam ine more specifially Labour's outlook on the
question of Com m on M arket entry in order to determ ine whether or not Labour's battle
over ideology was at the core of the decisions that were made in the Party concerning the
issue.
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CHAPTER II
LABOUR’S SOCIALIST OUTLOOK ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY

Britain first applied for entry into the Common M arket in August of 1961, under
the auspices of the M acm illan Conservative Governm ent. B ecause Britain had more
com plex external economic relationships than those of the six founding members of the
EE C , she was confronted with the problems of reconciling her overseas commitments
with the Treaty of Rom e. As it turned out, Macmillan's cabinet was unable to convince
both the leaders of the Com m onwealth countries and many in Britain that their interests
would be safeguarded. The negotiations in Brussels over the terms of entry eventually
broke down in the face of domestic and Commonwealth opposition to the Common Market's
agricultural policy and its tariff against m anufactured imports.
The Labour Party opposed

entry on

terms that it regarded as disadvantageous,

but in the end, it w as C harles de Gaulle, and not the Labour Party, who dashed the
im m ediate hopes for European unity by vetoing Britain's bid for entry in January of
1 963 . Four years later Labour's own application for entry failed because many within
this so-called "internationalist" party continued to oppose entry even when most Labour
leaders w ere of the opinion that the major difficulties in the Treaty had been overcome
and that the term s w ere favourable to Britain's entry. This chapter will consider the
debate that occurred within the Labour Party over the EEC issue from 1964, when a new
Labour G overnm ent took office, until the time when the idea of a referendum was
initially proposed as a feasible alternative for making a final decision on the issue. This
chapter will also attem pt to discover w hether or not the lack of ideological consensus
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within the party w as responsible for the split that developed

internally over the

question of Common Market entry.

The

Labour

Government

1964-1970

Prior to Labour taking office

in 1 9 6 4 ,

Harold W ilson

had often criticized

Macm illan's decision to enter Europe in 1961 at a time when Britain was economically
w eak. Wilson had stressed the importance of first facing, and then working towards a
solution to, the problem s that w ere posed by Britain's entry. In 1962, at its annual
conference, the Labour Party item ized these problem s as the Com m on Agricultural
Policy, the increase in the cost of living for the British citizen as a result of entry, an
increase in the British balance of paym ents deficit, the economic implications of British
entry to the C om m onw ealth countries, capital m ovem ents, and regional policies, all
issues that would have to be satisfied on Labour's terms before Britain could join the
Com m on M a rk e t.1 Once Wilson realized that Labour's conditions could not be met, there
w as no option left but officially to oppose Britain's entry on the terms set out by the
Brussels negotiations. Wilson was willing to discuss the idea of political integration with
the Six, but turned toward E FTA (European Free Trade Association) for negotiations
regarding the reduction of trade barriers between the Six and Britain. It is interesting
to note that at this time

it w as being said by political journalists that the party could

claim to be as doctrinally and personally united as it had been in 1945.2
W ilson's first priority as Prim e M inister w as to lay the groundwork of a new
structure designed for economic expansion in Britain. He was viewed as being oddly antiEuropean. According to the Manchester Guardian Weekly, Wilson exaggerated both the
political and economic (i.e. trading) roles of the Commonwealth. He also saw as Britain's
g reatest need to m ake her influence felt in W ashington, at the heart of the Atlantic
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Alliance, where he believed the vital decisions about Britain's future would be taken.3
Critics of the Labour Party have often overrated the chances of a crippling party
split on the issue of the E E C . A split

did not occur in 1959, when the party officially

adopted a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, and was even less likely to happen in
1 9 6 4 , w hen
h o w e ve r,

W ilson ten d ed to put party unity before policy innovation. In 1965,

in tra -p a rty

conflict

began

to

re e m e rg e .

Som e

m em bers

of

W ilson's

governm ent becam e more concerned with making policies to m eet public needs than with
worrying over w hether or not such policies were "Socialist" enough. Other government
m em bers tended to ask w hat the Socialist line was first, and then tried to make the
policy fit.

Th e majority of Labour party members outside the G overnm ent judged all

policies on the basis of their "Socialist" content.4
By 1 9 6 5 , W ilson's position had shifted slightly. The Labour G overnm ent was
faced with an im m ediate balance of payments crisis. The last time Britain was faced with
such a

crisis, Macm illan's governm ent was about to announce its decision to enter the

E E C . This tim e,

in o rder to com bat the problem , the G overnm en t sponsored a

supplem entary budget in Parliam ent that

included a 15 percent tem porary tariff on

imports of m anufactured goods, regardless of their source. Britain's E FTA partners
criticized these trade restrictions as violating Britain's obligation

under the EFTA

C onvention and Association A greem ent. H ow ever, according to P faltzgraff, it was
Britain's chronic econom ic difficulties, particularly her balance of paym ents problems,
that contributed to the strengthening of support within the parliam entary Labour party
for Com m on M arket m e m b ers h ip 3
By O ctober, W ilson w as again stressing the need for the right conditions, but
suggested that an agreem ent expressing the willingness of the EEC to provide safeguards
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for Britain's E F T A partners was close to being reached. Wilson believed the major
obstacles to entry at the time consisted of the financial burdens that would be imposed on
Britain by the Com m on Agricultural Policy (C A P) and the replacem ent of Britain's
extrem ely im portant trade with the C om m onw ealth. Britain's balance of paym ents
needed to be a lot healthier before it could carry these additional burdens, and it was this
sad state of the economy that brought negotiations with the EEC to a stalem ate by 1966.
It w as routinely reported by political journalists at the time that the key to successful
negotiations would be the G overnm ent's pressing forward with "contingency planning
both for eventual entry to the EEC and also for membership of a looser European free
trade area," in order to keep interest in some form of European association alive in the
interval betw een the deadlock of 1966 and m id -1968, when it w as hoped that the
economy would be restored to health and fresh negotiations would begin.6
The official Governm ent policy for Europe in 1966 was still that Britain had the
political will to join the E E C provided it’s "essential interests" w ere met. The phrase
"essential interests" was so open to various, and broad, interpretations that

it brought

C abinet differences to a head at a secret w eekend meeting of ministers at Chequers,
W ilson’s country residence. O f the 16 ministers at the m eeting, five w ere outspokenly
p ro -M a rk e t,

including

G e o rg e

Brown

(F o reig n

S e c re ta ry ),

Roy

Jenkins

(H om e

S e c retary ), Anthony Crossland (M inister of Education), Lord Longford ( Lord Privy
S eal), and

G eorge Thompson (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster). Five others were

equally outspokenly an ti-M arket, including Douglas Jay (P resident of the Board of
T r a d e ),

D en is

H e a le y

(D e fe n c e ),

Fred

P e a rt

(A g ricu ltu re),

B a rb a ra

C a s tle

(Transport), and Richard Marsh (Pow er). Of the remainder, the leader of the House of
C om m ons,

Richard Crossm an, tended to lean towards the anti-M arket argument, along
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with Anthony W edgew ood Benn (Technology). G eorge Stewart (Secretary of Economic
Affairs), and Jam es Callaghan (Chancellor of the Exchequer), both converted to the pro
-M a rk e t

side

in

1966.

It w as

not known

w hat opinion

Lord

G ard in er,

as

Lord

Chancellor, held.7
The final and most important person on the list, Wilson himself, seem ed to have
succeded, according to Ian Aitken, in "giving private comfort to both schools of thought
over a period of nearly two years."8 The pro-Europeans believed that he had converted
to their way of thinking. Th e anti-Europeans were convinced that he remained loyal to
their view s. It seem s reasonable to say that Wilson cleverly held the party together by
playing one side off the other at a time when he knew mounting unemployment and
financial difficulties would m ake Britain's European prospects negligible anyway.

Economic and Political Arguments
In Septem ber of 1967, Douglas Jay wrote a series of articles in the M anchester

Guardian Weekly examining the consequences for Britain if she w ere to enter the EEC.
Jay, in his econom ic argum ent, used the prospect of a worsening balance of payments
problem, which would be brought on by the implementation of the CAP, were Britain to
enter the E E C , as his reason for opposing Britain's entry into the Common Market. To
him, the costs of the increase in food prices, the rise in living costs, the loss of
Com m onw ealth and E F T A preference rights, import increases, and subsequently the
large am ount of capital outflow, far outweighed any benefits that might result from
entry. Th e only real advantage, in his opinion, would be access to the wider tariff-free
m arket in the S i x - a tariff that would be cut by the Kennedy round anyw ay. Jay
m aintained that it was common sense to avoid a situation that would cause lasting damage
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to Britain's balance of paym ents and from which it would be impossible to recover.9
Jay's political arguments for staying out of the EEC were threefold. First, there
would be the weakening of Britain's political strength in the world caused by the dam age
to her balance of paym ents.

In this case the political and economic arguments were

linked. Stated Jay, "A country that is repeatedly asking for financial help cannot exert
much political influence on others."19 Secondly, if ties (political as well as economic)
with Com m onwealth and EFTA countries were cut down, Britain would inevitably end up
in the position of junior partner to G erm any in the EEC. There was no evidence at the
tim e to show that a junior m em ber of a big block had more influence in the the world
than

a

sm all,

m ore

in d ep en d en t

state.

Thirdly,

joining

a

C om m unity

w h ere

a

"Commission has a power of legislating for the internal affairs of m em ber countries"
would be handing over to an "outside undem ocratic body the power to legislate on
unknown

internal issues in the fu tu re ."11 This would be a disastrous sacrifice of

sovereignty. T h e best policy, in Jay’s opinion, lay in association with the EEC rather
than outright m em bership, thus enabling Britain to continue to trade freely with an
enlarged Europe, but to contract out of the restrictive and undemocratic aspects of the
Rome Treaty and C A P .12
In O cto b er of 1 9 6 7 , the
supported

Labour Party C onference at S carborough

solidly

entering Europe. Although alm ost a third of the voting strength was cast

against entry, half of that opposition was accounted for by Frank Cousins' Transport and
G en eral W orkers Union. Cousins was joined by fellow rebels Douglas Jay and Joseph
S h in w ell.

The

p ro -M ark et

Foreign

S e c re ta ry ,

G eo rg e

Brown,

em p h asized

in

his

Conference speech that many of the problems voiced by the delegates were not problems.
He said that "Socialist' interests w ere not being ham pered. Agricultural policies w ere
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due to be renegotiated, and independent foreign policies w ere possible."13 He also
claim ed that Britain's influence, com bined with that of Europe, would allow Britain to
play a very large role in the world. It was Britain's duty to see that the EEC did not
becom e an "inward looking rich man's club."14 Following Wilson's speech on the state of
the economy, which ended in a standing ovation, all but a few delegates accepted the image
of their G overnm ent as a reforming force.15 The C onference effectively squelched the
previously growing idea of an Atlantic Alliance as an alternative to the EEC , and agreed
that it was better for Britain to play a leading role in Europe than to becom e, in effect,
the

fifty-first S ta te .
The case for Europe was argued in another series of articles in the M anchester

Guardian Weekly by G eorge Brown in 1969. He contended, in his economic argument,
that the tim e w as right to join, as far as agricultural and food prices were concerned,
and that the costs of staying out of the market were greater than the costs of going in,
particularly the loss of jobs for British workers. He also believed that as long as Britain
rem ained outside the E E C , British com panies would be confronted with tariff barriers
that w ould prevent them from expanding their trade with Common M arket countries.
Brown used statistics from the Board of Trade to support his argument that entering
Europe w ould m ean productivity and income increases as well as expanded export
m arkets for Britain. Clearly, according to Brown, the fundam ental advantage from EEC
entry would be a healthier industrial economy. To him, although the economic costs were
agreed to be finely balanced, even if the worst-case scenario were to develop, it would
only affect Britain for a handful of years. However, not joining the Community would
have a perm anent dead hand on what the Government could do for the British people for
the rest of the century.15

44

In his subsequent political argum ent in the Guardian

series, Brown maintained

that a united Europe, in a more equal partnership with the U .S. within N A TO , was the
most prom inent political issue for Britain in 1969. He referred to the possibility of the
U .S .

w ithdraw ing

its troops

from

Europe

in the

hope

of

lessening

its military

com m itm ents overseas, following its disastrous involvement in Vietnam . If Europe were
not united in anticipation of such an event, W estern Europe would be in very big trouble.
In Brown's view, an integrated W estern Europe would play an enorm ous role in world
affairs. As economic policy must be politically directed, an integrated Europe would need
a common economic policy, and therefore a political authority to establish such a policy
and carry it out. In recognizing the power of multinational corporation, he saw the need
to build up giant E u ropean-based firms able to face their Am erican counterparts in
world m arkets, and the need to control the political authority of these corporations,
whether based in the United States or based in Europe. These needs could be satisfied only
through common European policies. George Brown's bottom line was that as Britain was
already a part of Europe, she could become more effective in Europe's decisions only by
entering the Common M a rk et.17
Douglas Jay countered with a rebuttal in another article one w eek later entitled,
"The O ne Sure W ay to Ruin Britain." He reemphasized the points he had made two years
earlier, stating that the case against Britain's entry, at least in terms of her balance of
paym ents, had been grossly underestim ated. In his opinion, the gap between EEC and
British food prices had dram atically w idened, thereby enorm ously

increasing the

econom ic advantages to the U. K. of staying out. He predicted that entry costs would be
perm anent as long as the C A P continued in its present form, that agricultural protection
was so deeply em bedded in the histories of France, Germ any, and Italy that changes to
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C A P would be extrem ely unlikely, and finally, that the market would not be enlarged,
but rather narrowed, by the decrease in British exports and the increase in competitive
im ports. Jay m aintained that although Britain's true interest did lie in g reater allEuropean cooperation (political as well as economic), the EEC was not the correct or
sensible vehicle for reaching such a g oal.18
Despite the party's decision to enter the EEC on the right conditions at its 1967
C onference, it w as obvious by 1969 that much opposition still existed. In the face of
predictions of an improved economic climate and increased Labour support, the Labour
G overnm ent lost the election in 1970 and was replaced by Edward Heath's Conservative
G overnm ent. It w as, typically, a Labour Party in opposition that began to bring the
d eb ate onto a different level with such ideological arguments as what a "socialist" or
"social democratic" party required, and what the policy toward EEC entry should be in
order to m ake it consistent with Socialist ideology.

The Ideological Dilemma
H.M Drucker contends in his book, Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party, that
all Labour M inisters, as "Socialist" M inisters, face an ideological dilem m a that is
inherent in any mass Socialist party. That dilem m a is democratic socialism. Socialism is
of g reat im portance to the ethos of the party, but cannot be used as a fixed guide to
policy. According to Drucker, Labour's form of democratic socialism is not a theory of
politics or any coherent idea of how the government works. Instead, Drucker chooses to
describe the Labour Party's adaptation of a radical theory of politics to the ethos of the
working class as "manifestoism."19 This ideology assumes the sovereignty of the annual
conference. Drucker states, "Manifestoism is an attempt to control an executive . . . and
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m ake it responsive to the ideas and wishes of the party. It fits neatly into the radical
theory of the constitution which em phasizes the sovereignty of Parliam ent and grounds
that sovereignty on dem ocratic election. It is about representation first of all and only
secondarily, and indirectly, about governing."20 Manifestoism m akes no concessions of
principle to adjust to changing circumstances. It is a populist ideology with policies that
a re occasionally contradictory, frequently vag u e, and rarely

put in any order of

priority. In reality, the details of manifestos are so badly worked out that a Labour
Cabinet can often present any actions as consistent with the manifesto.21
Drucker suggests that if manifestoism w ere really a theory, rather than simply
an attem pt to control Labour's elected leaders, there would be "a much better worked
-out conception of how the manifesto was to be implemented. It would also require some
method of enforcing accountability to the annual conference.”22 He also suggests that we
have seen in recent years just how sadly lacking the procedure is, and what a high price
the party pays for it. T h e next section will attempt to illustrate Labour’s fundamental
w e a k n e s s -th a t of not knowing what it w a n ts -b y looking at the debates that took place
within the Labour Party while it w as in opposition over, arguably, the most important
decision ever to confront Britain in her history - the question of entry into the EEC.

The Conference Debates
As previously described, the EEC issue w as mainly argued in economic and
political term s, not ideological terms, while Labour was in office. But for the idealogues
within the party, the primary issue was always Socialism., Since the idealogues are more
com fortable in opposition, w here they are held responsible for little more than their
sp eech es, the argum ents for creating a Socialist Europe cam e to the forefront of
conference d eb ates in 1971 , after Labour had left office, and succeeded in further
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splitting the party between the idealogues on the left and the party leaders on the right.
But in this case the split widened over irreconcilable interpretations of what Socialism
called for concerning the EEC.

The Special Conference on the Common Market
A Special Conference on the Common Market was held on July 17, 1971. The goal
of the Conference was to agree on a definitive EEC resolution that would be submitted to
the annual conference. An examination of the debates that took place at the Special
C onference is needed

in order to more accurately determ ine their ideological content.

The Special C onference elicited more ideological arguments on the pro-M arket side than
on the anti-M arket side, even though it was conducted in such a way as to allow the same
number of delegates to speak on both sides.
Som e o f the argum ents in favor of entry w ere justified in economic terms. Paul
W hiteley (C olchester, C .L .P .) questioned w hether the issue should be argued at the
Socialist or anti-Socialist level. He argued that "the fact that the parties are split in
such a peculiar way and that people's values about what is Left and what is Right have
been split over the Com m on M arket, is indicative of the fact that [the Labour Party]
ought to look at things like the economic gains and economic costs."23 Whitely personally
felt that the gains outweighed the costs, but hoped that both arguments would be given
serious consideration. Michael Buckley (Halesowen and Stourbridge C .L.P .) admitted to
the difficulties of stop-go unemployment and the balance of payments problems. But he
em phasized the need to look at the realities of the world, which m eant looking at the
trading arrangem ents available to Britain, and the need to work within them , despite the
fact that they are not necessarily Socialist arrangem ents. Just because some Socialists

48

m ay not approve of them , does not mean that such arrangem ents do not exist.24 O n e
d eleg ate (R oger Evans, Society O f Labour Lawyers), took the point of view that the
Treaty of Rom e offered Socialists in Europe a perfectly adequate political framework for
the ach ievem ent of a Socialist future. He argued that capital could be controlled by
nationalisation, which is not forbidden by the Treaty of Rome. Regional grants, and

the

power to take unilateral action without the consultation of others when threatened by an
outflow of capital or balance of paym ent problem, w ere perfectly possible within the
Treaty.

Also, the Treaty does not forbid the use of the major tools of Socialism - the

governm ent paym ents to individuals, housing subsidies, and the financing of the health
system, housing and w elfare 26
Som e of the economic opponents to entry presented the following arguments at the
Special C onference. Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers' Union stated that
anyone who had studied the situation in detail knew full well that food prices and the cost
of living would increase dram atically upon entry, and that British employers were not
going to turn into S anta Claus overnight to meet the differences in living costs with big

w age increases.26 The Rt. Hon. Peter Shore, M .P., criticized the abandonm ent of the 120
year-old policy of ch eap food for Britain, and the switching from traditional low-cost
C om m onw ealth suppliers to the high-cost, inefficient farms of W estern Europe.27 A nd
the Rt. Hon. Douglas Jay, M .P ., in character with his earlier position, argued against
m em bership on the basis that control of the economy, particularly coal and steel which
the Labour M ovem ent had fought for 50 years to bring under the control of the British
people, would be largely handed over to an unelected body overseas.28
T h e "Socialist" argum ents for entry w ere put forward in varied, som etim es
vague and puzzling, forms. Bob Edwards from the Chemical W orkers' Union, who wrote a
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book entitled The United Socialist States of Europe, argued that the Socialist movement
actually began in Europe in 1947,

when the countries of Europe cam e together after the

w ar with the simple realization that they could not develop on their own. Since, to most
m em bers of the party, the roots of Labour's "socialism" w ere traced back to Karl Marx,
such a statem ent could have only added to the confusion of the party over the distinctions
of their ideology. Edwards w ent on to suggest that his "Comrades" take a look at how
Democratic Socialism could be developed. They would come to the conclusion that it could
include

a very large are a of Europe. H e ended with an appeal for the party’s active

support for Socialist ideas and Socialist institutions by entering Europe .29 Cryptic
references w e re also periodically used in support of argum ents for entry, such as
Richard Hoyle's citation of Nye Bevan's statem ent, "A good Socialist cannot be an
isolationist, nor even a nationalist; he must at all tim es be an internationalist," in
support of his argum ent for entry .30
H elen Brown (R ushcliffe, Nottingham shire C .L .P .) called for entry with, she
said, the sort of exciting, dynam ic Socialist thinking which had inspired so many people
in the country in the past.31 (S he failed to elucidate exactly what Socialist principles
she w as referring to.) And finally, the Rt. Hon. G eorge Thom pson, M .P ., a devout pro
-M arketeer, defined the Labour Party as, above all, an internationalist party. He voiced
his hope that

insular fear of change should not cause Britain to turn her back on the

Socialist Parties and democratic trade unions of Europe. He conceded the desire to tame
capitalism , but added that, at that tim e,

capitalism

could only be controlled on an

international basis.32
Th e ideological argum ents against entry were equally as muddled as their pro
-E E C counterparts. M any delegates, such as F. K. Hedderwick (North East Derbyshire

50

C .L .P .), resisted entry on the grounds that the EEC was not big enough, and rejected the
a lle g atio n that the only internationalists in the party were those who supported entry.
Those people who subscribed to HedderwicK's view saw the rest of the world as including
EFTA , North A m erica, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe - not just W estern Europe.33
Stan O rm e, M .P ., voiced his reservations about all the pro-M arket propaganda that was
going on. He believed that the party should be working out a policy of growth and
expansion, and instead of taking a little-Europe approach, the party should accept his
vision of internationalism and include the United Nations and the Third World in its
approach.34
Another obscure allusion surfaced when

Gordon Parry (P enbroke, C .L .P .)

referred to an article written by Aneurin Bevan in Tribune

in the late 50's in support

of his argum ent against membership. Bevan had said that you do not tam e the forces of
the jungle by planting more trees. It was Parry's belief that it was extrem ely important
for Labour mem bers, as Socialists, to tam e the forces of capitalism before they can build
a Socialist society.

If they w ere to put their own nation at risk by going in, then Britain

w ould find herself unable to control the play of forces.35 Parry failed to ascertain
precisely how the forces of capitalism were to be tamedO ther ideologues w ere more specific. Jim Sillars, M .P ., declared that he was
com m ited to opposing entry because the ethic of capitalism was enshrined within the
Treaty of Rom e. He believed that "to employ the relevance of Socialism we (the Labour
Party) must control the source and flow of the vast residual pow er that is contained
within capital. To do that m eans purposeful control. W e (the Labour Party) cannot do
that in the EEC."36 Eric Heffer, M .P ., asked the Conference to exam ine the realities of
the situation and pointed to the fact that the party's first responsibility is to the British
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people, and to the British working class above everyone else. And in Heffer's opinion, the
British working class would suffer considerably by joining the E E C .37 Anthony Judge
(Surbiton C .L .P .) w as quite vehem ent in his critique of pro-M arketeers when he told
the Special Conference that the last person to tell Britain that it could not go it alone was
Adolf Hitler. To him, the alternative to the EEC was a British Socialist G overnm ent
comm itted to Socialist planning - politically, economically and fiscally.38
As an interesting final note, a young Neil Kinnock, M .P ., of the Transport and
G en eral W orkers Union, spoke against entry, but did not mention any ideologically
related reasons for his oppostion. Instead, he simply claim ed that because he was a
m em ber of the Labour Party, and because he was a trade unionist, he was willing to use
any weapon available to him to beat the Tories and get them out of office.39
A m ongst the pro-M arket speakers there w ere 14 d elegates of Constituency
Labour Parties, 5 of trade unions, 4

ex-officio

delegates and one from a Socialist

Society, totaling 24. The anti-M arketeers numbered 14 speakers from C .L.P.'s, 7 from
trade unions, and 4 ex-officio delegates, making a total of 2 5 40
Harold W ilson, as Leader of the Party, gave the closing rem arks. His speech
detailed m any of the economic and political pro's and cons of entry

already debated at

great length, but most of his time was devoted to attacking the Tories and reiterating,
time and again, how the Labour Party’s policy has been consistent over the years. He
tactfully turned his neutral position into a unifying speech. He claimed, "The position of
this Party has rem ained consistent over this whole period. Our application was in. It
rem ain ed

in. If the

negotiations produced the necessary safeguards, the

Labour

G o vern m en t would have recom m ended entry to Parliam ent. In default of adequate
safeguards w e would have had confidence in our new ly-gained economic strength to
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sustain us outside the Com m on M arket."41 But the statem ent that fairly sum m ed up
Wilson's position at the time, and the statement that received much applause from the
Conference, was his rejection of the idea that to be considered a good European, one had to
be willing to subsidise inefficiency at great cost; that the very desirable objective of
g reater political unity in Europe, for which so many in the party had worked, should not
be achieved

at the cost of a 5 0 0 million pound subsidy to French agriculture.42 Wilson

ended his speech by stating the party's main objective - that of removing the Tories
from office. Only once the Labour Party again gained office could they have any chance or
hope of fulfilling their pledges and reaching their ideals. The final vote of the conference
resulted in a very large majority decision to support the N .E .C . statement which opposed
British entry to the C om m on M arket on the term s negotiated by the C onservative
G overnm ent, and favored submitting the question of entry to the British people at a
general election.

The 1971

Conference

At Labour's S eventieth Annual C onference at Brighton in the fall of 1971,
following the July Special C onference , all Labour delegates supported the decision to
call for a G eneral Election on the issue of EEC entry. It was continually brought to the
attention of the C o n feren ce that the credibility of dem ocratic institutions would be
d am ag ed if the Tories w ere allowed to continue to impose their will on a reluctant
people, as they had m ade no commitment on the common market issue during the 1970
election campaign, and therefore had no mandate.
M ost of the econom ic arguments at the 1971 Conference w ere lined up again in
opposition to entry. D. Hughes (Liverpool, W alton C .L .P .), the sponsor of Composite
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Resolution 3 5 calling for the withdrawal of Britain's application to join the E E C , stated
in his speech that increases in rates, rents, fares and unemployment w ere the reality of
living in a capitalist society, and that, in or out, the Common M arket was not the answer
to the problems of working class life. Hughes added that big businesses might profit from
entry, but the labour-intensive industries would be adversely affected and there would
be even more unem ploym ent.43 Patrick Craven (Lambeth, Norwood C .L.P.) concurred in
the view that the Tories sudden decision to em bark upon this so-called exercise in
internationalism w as simply the Conservatives doing the bidding of their paym asters,
which

include the large corporations, ICI and British Leyland. These w ere big financial

enterprises that would benefit most from Britain's entry. Craven even criticized those
who, along with him, opposed entry, and argued that Labour's anti-M arket supporters
who claim ed to be the true bearers of the Socialist and internationalist traditions of the
Labour Party w ere simply adopting the Tory arguments of yesterday. He stated, "Instead
of putting a clear Socialist answer to the EEC they have merely fallen back on talk about
the Com m onw ealth and the Parliamentary sovereignty of Britain."44
Jam es C allaghan, speaking for the national Executive Committee and presenting
econom ic argum ents against entry in the final speech of the Conference, criticized the
C A P and em phasized the need for safeguards and renegotiated terms. He warned the
C onference that to go into a Europe, where decisions would be taken by a Commission in
B russels elected by no one and responsible to no one, would not be his idea of
international cooperation based on mutual interest - which w as exactly what Britain
needed and w anted. He stated, "The future for the Labour M ovem ent, the future for
workers everyw here, the future for the developing countries and for the people who are
striving to raise their standards of life, is not in regional defensive blocs. It is in a true
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international system. It is in an open world, in breaking down the barriers."45
The main issue, however, was the debate on ideology, as evidenced at both the
S pecial C onference and the Annual C onference in 1971. The ideological arguments
presented at th e l 971 C onference in favor of entry, such as those raised by Douglas
M cEw an (Clackm annan and East Stirling, C .L.P .), suggested that the claim that the EEC
was an inward looking capitalist block is not supported by the facts, and that even though
all the Socialist parties of the Six had serious doubts about joining the M arket, none had
regretted their decision. All wanted Britain in.46 Other C .L.P . delegates agreed that the
Socialists of Europe did not consider the EEC a capitalist plot and w ere reaping the
benefits of entry in the form of increased productivity, expanded export m arkets, and
more jobs for the working class. Another proponent of EEC entry at the Conference said
that economic expansion through the EEC was the only was to ensure an adequate welfare
s ta te .47

In the case of the 1971 conference, most of those in the party who supported

entry on ideological grounds did so by pointing to the amount of growth and success

the

other socialist countries of Europe enjoyed as a result of membership in the Common
M a rk e t.
On the other hand, those in the party who opposed membership on ideological
grounds did so by stressing the cost of forfeiting

one of Labour's most necessary

"socialist" principles, that of sovereignty. For exam ple, Gordon O akes ( E x-o fficio ,
W idnes) believed that entry should be resisted on constitutional grounds, because, in his
opinion, acceding to the Treaty of Rome would turn the House of Commons into a parish
council. T h e House would have no power to alter a policy it felt w as not in the best
interests of British citizens because such decision-making powers (sovereignty) would

lie with the Council of Ministers in Europe.48 R. Wright of the A m algam ated Union of
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Engineering W orkers, spoke out against the Treaty of Rome as a betrayal of Socialism.
He declared that "the very nature of the Treaty and those elem ents within it that subject
the right of an independent G overnm ent to determine on public ownership, undermine all
those issues which we hold dear in this movement.”49
Law rence Daly of the National Union of Mineworkers told the Conference that
those who claim ed that opponents to entry were in some way denying Labour's socialist
and internationalist principles w ere far off the mark. In Daly's opinion, it is because
they are socialists and internationalists that they see Britain's role as socialists within
a very much larger community than that proposed by the Common Market. His union did
not feel that the advantage to be gained in the EEC, by threatening the markets of the
Polish as well as Am erican miners, would be the truly Socialist thing to do.50
Y et others stressed the dem ocratic argum ent. Ham m ond, for exam ple, of the
Electrical, Electronic, Telecom m unications Union, who contended that "on this most
important issue no one has the right to speak on another citizen's behalf, no Prime
Minister, no M em b er of Parliam ent and no G eneral Secretary, without the citizen's or

member's own manifest decision and consent."5 "! It was at this Annual Conference that the
notion of holding a national referendum on the issue of Common M arket membership
began to take shape.
Th e opponents to entry at the Conference w ere in the majority, strongly carrying
Resolution

16 that o pposed entry on the term s negotiated by the

C onservative

Governm ent. Com posite Resolution 35, which opposed entry on any terms was lost, but
not by a large margin. O f the 31 speakers at the Conference, only 6 favored entry with
the terms set out by the Tories (including G eorge Brown), while the other 25 united
against them . Th e majority of those 25 opposing speakers favored letting the people
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decide through a referendum . Only two of the eight trade union spokesmen cast their
votes for entry.52
It is relevant to note at this time that the party had just undergone the largest
shift to the left in its history following the 1970 election. As the trade unions on the
left, and most Labour m em bers

considered to be leftists, consistently voted against

m em bership to the Com m unity, the outcome on Resolution 16 was hardly surprising.
The question is w hether the traditional ideological split in the party betw een left and
right w as evident here. As both proponents and opponents to Britain's entry used
"socialist" values and goals in support and defence of their arguments, it is too difficult
to draw any adequate conclusions without some further investigation into the debates,
such as those offered at the

Annual Conference that was held the following year in

O ctober of 1972.

The Annual Conference of 1972
It would be remiss to exclude some account of the way in which the debate ensued
in 1972. Resolution 43, of the Labour Party's Annual Conference in 1972, which stated
that Britain had a major role to play in the European Community and which urged the
creation of a working party by the N E C to cooperate with Britain's Com rades on the
continent in an attem pt to create a dem ocratic Socialist Europe, was overwhelmingly
d efeated. Com posite 44, which called for opposition to the EEC on the Tory terms, and
indicated the specific policy changes that would m ake entry acceptable to a Labour
G overnm ent, w as carried by a slight margin. The final resolution, num ber 45, which
declared complete opposition to entry on any terms, was also soundly defeated.53
At this Conference,

the arguments w ere similar, but appeared to becom e more
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heated and intense. Som e suggested that the only planning envisaged by the Treaty of
Rome was supranational planning for the one purpose of enhancing free competition. One
d eleg ate m aintained that the argum ent about entry was not just about ideology. The
argum ents are also about political and economic facts.54 Accusations of breaking ranks
and saving the Tory Governm ent w ere also leveled, and statements blaming members for
the disunity in the party w ere more frequent. Even the phrasing of the speeches took a
harsher tone. For exam ple, it w as common to hear such phrases as "to connive in the
dismantling of the power of the British people" and "suicidal for our M ovem ent to take
up a position of com plete and utter hostility to the M arket."55 There is no lack of
exam ples. M ichael Foot even suggested that to deny the people the right to decide the
issue would be a betrayal of dem ocracy, perhaps because he realized the party was
beginning to split wide open

and a device might soon be needed to prevent the whole

party from collapsing. Harold W ilson, who at this point w as straining his unifying
talents to the limit, again devoted his speaking time to attacking Heath. He also challenged
the pro-M arket new papers (whose editors w ere attending the Conference) to print the
635 words from the Cabinet papers quoted in Hansard which listed dem ands that he, as
Prime Minister,

and the Foreign Secretary had told the H eads of Governm ent of the Six

would have to be met before Britain would enter. He asked the editors to say whether
they honestly thought the Tory G overnm ent had met those terms. Wilson ended this
Conference by saying that the issue was not one of personalities, and he was not about to
let it becom e one, once again stressing the consistency of the party and the need to
renegotiate the term s of entry.5 6

Conclusion
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T h e argum ents heard from within the Labour Party betw een 1964 and 1975
over British m em bership in the C om m on M arket show that, since both sides used
ideological Socialist argum ents, it was, perhaps, the lack of ideological definition that
was at least partially responsible for the split that developed and widened over the issue.
The failure of the party to unite on EEC entry can be blamed on the sam e reaons R.H.
T aw n ey gives for the failure of the 1929-31 governm ent. He believed then that "The
gravest w eakness of British Labour is one which it shares with the greater part of the
world, outside Russia. . . . It lacks a creed. . . It does not achieve what it could, because it
does not know w hat it w ants . . . This w eakness is fundam ental. If it continues
uncorrected, there neither is nor ought to be, a future for the Labour Party."57
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CHAPTER III
FROM THE DEBATE TO THE REFERENDUM: PRESERVING LABOUR’S
UNITY

On O cto b er 28th
E uropean

1 9 7 1 , on the vote of principle on British entry into the

Econom ic C om m unity, 131

m em bers of Parliam ent, that is one in five,

rebelled against their party lead ers.1 The. vote showed the extent of factionalism that had
developed within Britain's two parties over the volatile issue of joining the Common
M arket. The controversy between and among Conservative and Labour M .P.'s continued
unabated until 1975, when the Wilson Labour Governm ent decided to put the question to
the British people. This chapter will attem pt to determ ine if the referendum of 1975
was used as a device by the Labour Party to avoid a split in the party over the issue of
Britain's entry into the EEC .

The Labour Party and Europe: A Four-Way Split
Opinion within the Labour Party over entry into the EEC can be divided in four
w ays, according to Anthony King. First, there were the "pro-Europeans," or those who
strongly favored entry into the E E C . This group accounted for about one-quarter of
Labour M .P.'s in the House of Commons. They had substantial trade union support. The
third

largest union

W o rk e rs ,

with

in the country, the

6 5 0 ,0 0 0

m e m b ers,

National

consistently

Union of G en eral and
supported

B ritain's

Municipal
entry

into

E u ro p e.2 The leader of this group was Roy Jenkins, who had, King argues, "a personality
that w as in itself to prove a factor in the internal party struggle."3 The second group,
referred to as the Tribune Group and numbering about one-quarter of the parliamentary
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Labour party (P L P ), w as the left-wing of the party, most of whom opposed British
membership in the Common M arket. Their best-known spokesman was the "acid-tongued
platform orator," M ichael Foot.4 The two largest unions in the country were members of
this group. Not all of Labour's

anti-Europeans w ere left-wingers. The third group, King

notes, were anti-European party moderates:
A substantial minority of the party's moderates w ere passionately hostile
to Europe . . . . They worked together with the left on the European issue and their p resence m ade it possible for the left to claim, with justice,
that the European debate was not just another manifestation of the age-old
struggle betw een right and left for the party's soul.5
There w ere two leaders of the moderate anti-Europeans; Douglas Jay, an economist, and
Peter Shore, a man who had served in Harold Wilson's cabinet since 1967.
The final group was residual. It was composed of M .P.'s who may have been for
or against going into Europe, or may have been com pletely neutral. W h atever their
view s, they believed that maintaining party unity was of much more importance than
achieving any specific results over the issue of Europe.6 This group included Harold
Wilson and Jam es Callaghan. It would be considered the "swing" group because it was
crucial in determining the balance of power in the party. The M .P .s in this group were
p articu la rly

se n sitiv e

to

public

opinion,

constituency

con cern s,

and

the

party

conference manifesto. "These were the M .P.s most prone to follow a pro-European lead if
it w ere given by a Labour G overnm ent, most prone to be hostile if the Conservatives
w ere in pow er."7 These are the people who were likely to claim that it was the terms of
entry that they w ere most concerned with. They would be in favor of entry on the right
terms, against it on the wrong ones.

An Ideologically Divided Party

64

Listening to the debate going on in the Labour Party during the sixties and early
seventies, it would be difficult to believe that the individual arguments advanced were an
M .P .'s only motives. The issue does not appear, in retrospect, to have

warranted the

fervor, detail, or importance that was expressed over it. King suggests that, beneath the
surface econom ic arguments over the future of the balance of power in Europe and its
prospects for growth, lay the recurrent problem of an ideologically divided party.
The roots of factions can be traced

to the leftist movements of the 1940's, such

as the Keep Left movem ent, and the much older Fabian Society. T h e prospect of the
developm ent of a large and rebellious block was signalled by the resignation of three
ministers back in 1951 over Gaitskell's decision, as Minister of Health, to charge for
prescriptions under the National Health Service. Those who resigned did so because they
believed the party leaders w ere sacrificing basic principles. The leftist faction in the
60's favored policies of unilateral nuclear disarm am ent and greater public ownership of
industry. It resisted the idea of the mixed economy. For its m embers, the interests of the
working class should be protected by the welfare state at all costs, and through such
socialist practices as the worker's ownership of the m eans of production. The leftists
continued to pick up m om entum in the 60's and early 70's under the influence of
Anthony W edgew ood Benn, who saw British entry into the EEC as a betrayal of socialism.
King argues, "The left-wingers w ere seized of an idea . . . . that the countries of the Six
w ere som ehow inherently 'capitalist' and that, if Britain joined the EEC , it would be
joining a capitalist power bloc from which it could never escape."8 Essentially, the EEC
is a kind of controlled capitalism . Full participation would deny Britain the right to
m anage the British econom y by a policy of direct controls (e.g. import quotas). By
forcing open the British econom y to the free flow of goods and services, the EEC
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necessarily forces Britain to use fiscal and monetary policy to m anage the economy,
tools favored more by Conservatives than by Labour, which traditionally, and on the
left, favors direct controls on imports and exports. Actually, full integration would
ultimately elim inate monetary policy too, leaving economic m anagem ent to fiscal means
(taxes) alone. Th e divisions in the party w ere thus not just divisions over policy. They
w ere divisions of ideology, of political views, and of personal preferences. It was not
certain after 1970 that the party could survive such divisions.9

Wilson's Change of Heart
Th e Labour Party's election manifesto in 1970 was, if anything, more positive
ab o u t

EEC

entry

than

w as

the

C o n servative 's.

W hen

the

P arliam en tary

Party

reassem bled at W estm inster that year, it had lost 11 form er m em bers and gained 52
new m em bers. In Kitzingers view, the Party that em erged from the election was slightly
m ore pro-E uropean in composition than at the dissolution.10

W hen Labour was in

opposition in 1 9 6 1 -6 3 it w as against entry. W hen Labour cam e to power in 1964, it
m ade Britain's first and only unconditional application for entry, in 1967. Back in
opposition in 1970, Labour once again turned against entry on Conservative terms, and
by m id-1972 it looked as if the party was going to decide to withdraw from Europe. "But
then such large g eneralizations hide internal differences which -

as in almost any

party of the Left -- tend to be not only more interesting but also more obtrusive than
the unifying factors," Kitzinger a rg u e d .1 1 He added that although, on the surface, it
seem ed as if the terms of entry determined support and opposition, the key explanations
must be found in the grass roots distrust of the EEC, in the volleying of the leadership
from Opposition to G overnm ent and back again, and in the internal divisions that arose
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between the most active trade union leaders and the parliamentary leadership.-!2
W hether or not Wilson's change of position at that time was an actual change of
belief
H arold

is difficult to determ ine. Kitzinger advances four theories that could account for
W ilson's d ram atic conversion

to

EEC

entry

in

1966. The

first concerns

personnel policy. G eorge Brown, W ilson's Secretary of S tate and one of the most
enthusiastic supporters of Com m on M arket entry in the C abinet, had threatened to
resign in July of 1 96 6 over the econom ic crisis that had hit Britain. W ilson's good
friend and confidante at the time, Lord W igg, believed that Wilson's conversion was not
due to conviction. It was a result of the fact that he had to keep Brown and Callaghan in
check and hold the Cabinet together in the shadow of the July crisis. The Prime Minister
had to produce a device that looked workable and sounded decisive.13 Wilson needed to
m ove his position towards favoring entry in order to be perceived as less one-sided by
the p ro -M arket m em bers of his C abinet. On the other hand, his assurance that an
application would only be m ade given the "right terms" was the device he used to pacify
the anti-M arket m em bers of his Cabinet. This stratagem also succeeded in calming the
fears of G eorge Brown and Jam es C allaghan, who believed the solution to Britain’s
economic woes lay in Britain's becoming part of the European Community.
Another theory sees Harold Wilson's conversion as a result of the economic crisis
of July 1966 itself. In his Bristol speech in March of the sam e year, Wilson stated that
Britain was prepared to join under the right terms. He recollects, "The main stress was
on our hopes of w hat entry into the EEC on the right terms could mean for Britain and
Europe, in particular in technology, where we had a strong lead to give."14 Th e right
term s obviously must have been agreed upon within the next year, because the Labour
G overnm ent applied for entry in 1967. The dating is important here and would discount
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the theory that Britain's economic troubles caused the change in policy. Wilson's speech
signalled a change in attitude months before the economic crisis. After all, Kitzinger
would say, before the crisis there was no great conviction anywhere that the economic
effects of entry would clearly benefit the country.15
A third theory concerned Harold Wilson's realization of problems which w ere the
result of Britain continuing to play the role of world po licem an .16 On O ctober 22,
1966, in a meeting at Chequers to discuss European policy, G eorge Brown and Michael
Stewart presented a paper "that argued the case for entry into the EEC almost entirely in
political term s - as an issue of Britain's whole place in the w orld."17 W ilson was
obviously influenced by the argum ent that no one would take Britain seriously unless
she applied to be a part of the new Europe.
This theory can be considered subordinate to the final theory which views
W ilson's conversion mainly in terms of dom estic party politics. It was believed that
public

discussion

of

entry

p ossibilities,

and

sw itching

public

attention

to

an

international stage, would take people's minds off economic failure at home, and at the
sam e time (as interpreted by Labour anti-M arketeers) take the wind out of the sails of
the opposition, thus effectively removing a potentially divisive issue from the arena of
p arty

c o n tro v e rs y .18 A lso, W ilson's surprise decision to tour the "Six" capitals in

N ovem ber of 1966 w as seen as an effort to reassure the pro-M arketeers that George
Brown w as not actually running the show, and to show them that Wilson himself was
very serious about entering. It is ironic that Brown ended up in the role of

brakeman to

Wilson's rush towards an unconditional bid for membership at that time.
After the 19 70 election, which Labour lost, the trade unions began to take a
much clearer an ti-M arket stand. At the Party Conference in S eptem ber of 1970, the
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form er Prim e Minister's European policy was under heavy attack. The Transport and
G eneral W orkers Union (T G W U ) brought in a motion "opposing entry on any terms that
threatened employment, the cost of living, or the independence of political, economic and
foreign p o lic ie s ."l9 The T G W U resolution w as defeated by a majority of only 95,0 0 0
votes. As the yea r drew to a close the anti-M arketeers in the party gained further
ground, and prep ared

to m ove the party aw ay from

its position w hen

next in

governm ent. Anthony W edgew ood Benn and Douglas Jay both began calling for a
referendum . T h e National Executive voted the proposal down, though Jim Callaghan
described it as "a life-raft into which the whole party may one day have to climb". A late
D ecem ber National Executive meeting, by a vote of 15 to 1 on the old T G W U resolution
calling for a referendum , decided that a special party conference should be held before
Parliam ent decided on the is s u e .20 a debate took place a w eek later after which Wilson
stated that "though strong reservations, indeed outright opposition, were expressed from
a minoirity on both sides of the Commons, we were able to feel that we had been given a
fair

wind

for

our

initiative"

to

co nsider

the

possibilities

of

holding

a

national

re fe re n d u m .21

The "Slide" from Europe
Th e formal position of the Labour G overnm ent as it left office in 1970 was a
com m itm ent to British entry into the E E C . At the Labour Party Conference that year,
W ilson m aintained that the party "would be prepared to accept the T reaty of Rome,
subject to the necessary adjustments consequent upon the accession of a new mem ber and
provided that we receive satisfaction on the points about which we see difficulty."22 But
betw een June of 1970 and the fall of 1972 there was a drastic change in the Labour
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Party's position. The National Executive Committee, the PLP, and the annual conference
all cam e to renounce the terms of entry negotiated by the Conservative Government. In
addition, the term s of entry that might be acceptable to a future Labour Governm ent
w ere set out in such a rigorous w ay as to am ount to a rejection of the British
committment to enter the EEC.
T h e "slide" from Europe began after the general election in 1970. Labour's
annual conference that year narrowly passed a motion reaffirming the com m itm ent to
entry, though not unconditionally.

But as soon as the terms of the negotiations were

m ade known by the Conservative Governm ent in early 1971, Harold Wilson, in a speech
at the Special Conference on the Common Market (July 1971), made it known that they
would be unacceptable to a Labour Government. Consulting the Labour Government White
Paper of 1967, Wilson stated that the party had set out the four principle condtions that
needed to be met before Britain could enter the EEC then, and that those same conditions
still need ed to be satisfied in 1971. The first condition concerned the burden on
Britain's balance of paym ents. The Labour Party claim ed that there would be definite
dam ag e to m any of Britain's large, traditional export m arkets as a result of being
required to adopt the Com m unity's rules. The Conservative G overnm ent, on the other
hand, w as willing to perm it the British taxpayers to bear the burden, which by 1971,
w as much greater than estim ated in 1967.23
Labour's second condition concerned the question of capital movements. The Party
believed that sudden movements of capital, even with safeguards and a strong balance of
paym ents surplus, would endanger Britain's reserves, her em ploym ent position, and
her ability to build up capital investment in industry. Labour accused the Conservative
G overnm ent of negotiating aw ay all the necessary safeguards against large capital
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m ovem ents.24
The

third issue stressed

Labour's com m itm ent to safeguarding

the

sugar

producers of the Com m onwealth. The Conservatives, to Labour's indignation, sought no
guaran tees from the Six on Com m onw ealth sugar. The fourth condition, som ew hat
similar to the third, w as Labour's obligation to N ew Zealand's cheap food producers.
Heath's Conservative Governm ent again failed to get binding assurances on New Zealand
written into the agreem ent at the EEC negotiations.25
Soon after the Special Conference, the National Executive publicly condemned the
Tory term s of entry and called upon the PLP to unite in opposition to the Governm ent
policy. Later, at the 1971 annual conference in October, the NEC 's view was accepted by
a large majority. It was around this time that nearly half of the PLP signed the House of
Commons motion stating that entry into the EEC on the terms set out so far would not be
in the best interests of the c o u n try 25

King records that when the House of Commons

took th e vote on the issue of entry on O ctober 28th,

a g reat m ajority of the

parliam en tary Labour party, 198 m em bers, voted with Wilson to reject the Tories'
terms. But

69 Labour m em bers, led by Roy Jenkins, George Brown's successor as the

deputy leader of the party, abandoned the party on this issue and defied both the party
conference decision and a three-line whip by voting with the Conservative Government.
Another twenty pro-Europeans abstained. Along with the deputy leader, the chairman of
the PLP, Douglas Houghton, and three members of the Shadow Cabinet, Harold Lever,
Shirley Williams, and George Thompson, also defected, and in so doing, staged a rebellion
on a scale unprecedented in the history of the party.27 Only nine members of Wilson's
seventeen form er cabinet m em bers still voted with him. Som e of the rebels w ere highly
respected m em bers of the party of long-standing. Others were some of the youngest and
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most talented m em bers of the party who would alm ost certainly play vital roles in
future

Labour

rebelling

G o v e rn m e n ts .28 But the Labour rebels soon realized that to go on

w ould

C o m m un ities

be

political

Bill w as

suicide.

passing

T h e re fo re ,

through

the

during

C om m ons,

reluctantly joined forces to vote down provisions of the bill.

the
pro-

tim e
and

the

European

an ti-M arketeers

"Renegotiate" rather than

"withdraw" becam e the party them e, and was adopted as party policy at Labour's 1971
annual conference. King maintains, "The slide from Europe considerably em barassed the
Labour Party, which w as pilloried in the press as irresponsible, inconsistent, and
opportunistic. It evidently em barassed Harold Wilson, who w as repeatedly at pains to
claim that, despite everything, he had not really shifted his position."20

Accounting for Labour's Split
W hat, then, accounted for Labour's divisions? First, it should be noted again that
there had always been a great deal of opposition to entry within the party. The two votes
in 1 9 6 7 m erely concealed its extent. King suggests that Wilson's success in rallying
enough of his party to support an application to the EEC in 1967 was a result of the
simple fact that Labour w as in power.30 However, when the Labour Governm ent of 1967
took such a tough position on the terms of entry, even doubtful Labour M .P.'s were
convinced to go along with the Governm ent. But by 1971, the slide began to accelerate
when Labour w as no longer in power, the Tory terms were made known, and the Treaty
was about to be signed.
A nother contributing factor was the attitude of Edward Heath. He continuously
offended the trade unions so that Labour M .P.'s who favored entry into the EEC but
opposed the governm ent on everything else would find it difficult to vote with him for
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fear of being labeled

traitors.

T h e factor that could be considered most important in explaining the Labour
Party

split, how ever, w as the greatest shift to the left in the Labour

Party’s history,

which occurred betw een 1970 and 1972. In contrast to Kitzinger's observation that the
PLP

em erged from the 1970 election as slightly more European, King believed that in

the two years following

the election, pro-M arket sympathies began to sway to the left.

King states,
This shift to the left w as brought about by an increase in the number of
left-wing Labour M .P.'s and, more particularly, by a shift in the balance
of power from right to left inside the trade unions. As the unions moved to
the left, so too did the annual conference and the National Executive, both
of which the unions, directly or indirectly, controlled.31
M ost

attribute the shift to the failure of W ilson's m oderate policies

C o n seq u en tly, the y ears
m oderates

1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 2

of 1 9 6 4 -1 9 7 0 .

w ere particularly difficult years for the party

and for the causes for which they

fought, including Europe. Labour’s retreat

from Europe w as part of a general m ovem ent towards policies more extrem e than any
the party had experienced in the past.32
Wilson had to develop a strategy that would enable him to retain his position as
party leader, and at the sam e time present a united and credible party to the country. He
em phasized his duties as leader of the party in his July 1971 speech to the party's
special conference:
I charge this M ovem ent, as I have the right and duty to do, so to conduct
this deb ate as to respect and honour the views of all m em bers of the
Party, and indeed of others, regardless of what those views may be. W e
must recognize that what divides us is an important policy issue, not an
article of faith.33
Wilson had never m eant to be neutral and sided with the pro-M arketeers, who were in
the minority by the 1970's, in order to balance out the opposition. He did not wish the
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party to com pletely reverse itself and come out against Common M arket membership,
but he never seem ed to lose sight of the fact that the party was in opposition. Therefore,
he played for time. He knew that if he forced the issue, the party would split and the anti
Europeans would win. Thus, his policy was not to press the issue. The party's internal
battle w as permitted to continue to a certain extent. Wilson realized that, as a party in
Opposition, Labour could risk the conference resolutions and N E C statements that lacked
the pow er and bite of G overnm ent decisions in order to maintain some sem blence of
party dem ocracy. He also understood that it could be years before the party returned to
pow er, by which tim e Britain's EEC m em bership would be ir r e v e r s ib le .3 4 it was not
until later, in 197 2, that Wilson seem ed to realize that a referendum might constitute
another possible elem ent in his strategy.

Decision to Hold a Referendum
"The decision to hold a referendum was

a direct outcome of Labour's internal

struggle over Europe. T h e C onservatives played alm ost no part in the decision,"
according to Anthony K in g .3 5 it was quite commonly believed that if som eone was in
favor of having a referendum he was an anti-M arketeer, simply because opinion polls at
the tim e show ed that the electo rate,

given the opportunity, would vote against

m em bership in the Com m on M arket. Therefore, it follows that the pro-M arketeers were
against holding a referendum . The moderates leaned toward the referendum to prevent
the party from splitting.
It appears that Tony Benn is the one individual most responsible for the Labour
Party's decision to hold the referendum . Although originally a supporter of British
m em bership, Benn was to change his position to the extent of becoming the most avid
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proponent of referenda in general, not just on the Common M arket issue. Another Labour
figure and an ti-M arketeer, Douglas Jay, m aintained that if Britain w ere to relinquish
some

of its sovereign power to the European Community, the independence of the nation

would be in jeopardy. Therefore the British people must be directly consulted. According
to King,
P arliam en t would be giving up a substantial part of its pow er to an
outside body over which it could have little control. And the decision would
be irreversible; Parliam ent could not bind its successors in theory, but
in practice it was clear that, once such substantial powers had been given
up, they could never be recovered.36
M otions in favor of a referendum w ere put to the National Executive by the
Transport and G eneral W orkers Union in 1970, and again at the party conference in
O ctober of 1971, where they were defeated by large margins. Nonetheless, the obvious
advantage for the anti-M arketeers of holding a referendum was in the opportunity it
would provide to prevent Britain joining, or to w ithdraw if Britain w ere already a
m e m b e r.37 Th e advantages for Wilson and the other m iddle-of-the-roaders was also
apparent. A referendum would, King argued;
m ake it possible for the party to present itself to the electorate as more
dem ocratic than the C onservatives: it would enable the party to avoid
having to take the ultimate decision on the European issue, which divided
it so deeply; and it would buy time, since the party need not come to a final
view on the issue, even in the form of a recommendation to the electorate,
until the eve of any referendum campaign 36
Wilson w as used to referring to the referendum as "a free vote of the British people".
King notes that it is precisely on issues that internally divide the major political parties
that free votes are most likely to be held in the British House of Commons 39
Those who resisted the idea of a referendum w ere undermined by the fact that
Norw ay, D enm ark and Ireland had already decided to hold referenda on their country’s
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entries into the EEC . Britain was beginning to look like
would not be

the only country whose people

consulted directly on the issue.40 The National Executive, on March 22nd

1972, reversed its policy by a slim majority vote for which Wilson, Callaghan, and Roy
Jenkins were all absent. The vote prompted the resignation of 3 top Labour leaders who
w ere pro-M arketeers; Roy Jenkins, George Thompson, and Harold Lever.4 1
Wilson discovered that, despite the resignations, there was still a respectable
num ber of pro-Europeans on the Labour front benches. Therefore, he was determined
not to permit the party to come out flatly against EEC membership in principle.

At the

annual conference in O ctober of 1972, the National Executive carried a resolution by a
tw o-thirds m ajority that the decision on entry into the
electorate, if renegotiation w ere successful.

E E C would be put to the

"What had emerged," says King, "was that

the policy of consulting the people was the policy that divided the party least."42 Even
Roy Jenkins agreed to return to the fold and successfully stood for Shadow Cabinet
reelection in 1973. O nce the party had made the final decision in 1972 to consult the
people by m eans of a referendum , it was inevitable that a referendum would be held if
the Labour Party w ere ever to gain office while the option to withdraw from the Common
M ark e t still e xis te d .43 Labour's decision to hold a referendum
Britain's

term s of entry with

EEC

m em bers, was

taken

w hile

and to renegotiate
the party was

in

opposition. By the end of 1974, Labour had been returned to office with an overall
parliam entary majority. The renegotiations had begun. The decision to hold a referendum
had been made.44

Debate Over the Referendum
O n ce Labour w as back in office, the an ti-M arketeers found seven Cabinet
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m inisters publicly on their side, together with about thirty other ministers and a
majority of Labour backbenchers. But they had to face the reality of a Labour Prime
M in ister,

tw o-thirds

of

his

cab in et,

and

a

m inority

each

of backb en ch ers,

the

constituency parties, and the trade unions, who were all committed to a "Yes" vote on the
referen d u m .

Yet

B utler

m aintains

that

even

the

h ard-line

a n ti-M a rk e te e rs

w ere

reluctant to split the party too deeply.45
T h e first battle betw een the pro-M arket and anti-M arket factions
M arch 2 6 ,

cam e on

1 9 7 4 , w hen the N ational Executive C om m ittee, Labour's adm inistrative

authority, approved a statem ent on the EEC negotiations which said, "The National
Executive Com m ittee believes that on both economic and democratic grounds, the best
interests

of the

British

people

would

be served

by a 'No' vote

in the

coming

referendum ."45 Because it was left unclear what arguments w ere t0 be put to the party
and to the electorate, the Transport House R esearch D epartm ent, headed by anti
-M arketeer Geoff Bish, issued a statement for approval by the N EC . W hen the statement
cam e before a sub-com m ittee, on April 23rd, and subsequently when it cam e to the full
N E C , p ro -M a rk e te e r Jam es C allag han

subm itted 2 9 7 am endm ents, describing the

statem ent as "a disgrace to the nam e of research."47 (The document was issued to all
d e leg ates at the S pecial C onference only 'for inform ation’ and without the N EC 's
endorsem ent.) Also on April 23rd, the N E C decided that Bryan Stanley (to Benn's
displeasure) and Michael Foot would respectively open and close the anti-M arket case at
the Special Conference. On the pro side, it was to be Harold Wilson and James Callaghan
to present the opening and closing rem arks. At that conference held on April 26th, _
1974, to determ ine the fate of the NEC pronouncement, the Conference voted 3,724,0 00

to 1 ,9 8 6 ,0 0 0 to support the N EC statem ent opposing continued m embership.48
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W hen the N E C next assembled on May 1st, Ron Hayward, the General Secretary,
m ade it plain that there would be no anti-M arket campaign. He explained that there was
no m oney to spare and some pro-M arket trade unions had indicated that they would take
it ill if their affiliation fees w ere applied to anti-M arket propaganda.49 He also stated
that "a large num ber of constituency parties and Transport House staff, together with
most of the regional organisers, had expressed dismay at the divisive situation."59 As
G eneral Secretary he did not want to do anything that would tear the party to pieces.
No one seems to know exactly what happened between April 26th and May 1st to
neutralize the party organization after the anti-Europe motion was adopted by the NEC.
Som e spoke of heavy pressure on the party from Downing Street. Som e even suggest that
a secret agreem ent was reached betw een the party leadership and leftist anti-M arket
leaders, Tony Benn and Ian Mikardo, in order to present a united Labour Party

to the

public. W h atever m eans w ere used, following the abortive Special Conference on April
26th, Butler and Kitzinger argue, "everyone professed himself satisfied: each side had
been reassured that the other would not over-reach itself."51 The Labour Party, by way
of official statem ents, would oppose continued membership in the EEC , but would not
initiate a campaign for withdrawal throughout the country.
T h e press chose to interpret the affair as a triumph for the pro-M arketeers.
Thus,

m any of the an ti-M arketeers felt the Conference had a negative effect. They

thought that the politicking before and after the Conference had helped to contribute to
the neutralizing of local Labour parties.52 It took the dissenting ministers awhile to
realize that it would be impossible for them to oppose entry through the Labour Party.
They probably could have pushed the Special Executive on May 1 st to begin a mobilizing
cam paign, but they soon saw that such a campaign would be counter-productive. "The
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party's resources w ere limited and the loyalties of its staff and its supporters were
divided. Any attem pt to run a 'No' cam paign like a Labour Party general election
cam paign was doom ed to failure."53 Therefore, during the referendum campaign, some of
the ministers w orked quietly and independently. Others worked through the National
Referendum Com m ittee (N R C ). They faced a number of problems. Butler and Kitzinger
explain, "They did not all think alike. They w ere in greater or lesser degree inhibited by
the fact that

Harold

W ilson

would

still be presiding

over the cabinet after the

referendum . They were reluctant to be accused of personal attacks or boat-rocking."54
The main brunt of the campaign was borne by Peter Shore and Tony Benn. On the whole,
the anti-M arket ministers did not try to take over N R C activities. They more of less 'did
their own thing'. They did m ake speeches and attend press conferences when requested.
The activites of w hat was left of the official anti-referendum campaign w ere not very
closely coordinated, and therefore the campaign itself cannot be considered a product of
the efforts of its leading a c to rs 55

Conclusion
On June 5th 1975, 64 .5 % of the electorate turned out to vote. The overwhelming
m ajority of voters, 1 7 ,3 7 8 ,5 8 1 , said "Yes" to Britain's remaining in the E E C . Only
8 ,4 7 0 ,0 7 3 voted in favor of withdrawal 55 All of the evidence supports the conclusion
that, although other factors played a role, the decision to hold a referendum was made by
Labour Party leaders in order to avoid a vote on the issue that would have split the party
wide open. Butler and Kitzinger concluded, "When the referendum was over, the issue
ceased to divide the country. The decision to stay in the EEC was accepted; and to that
extent, the device fulfilled precisely the purpose it had been assigned."57
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CONCLUSION
T h e traditional ideological split betw een

left and right in the Labour Party

developed as a result of the different views and ideas among members of the party of
what it m eant to be a "Socialist." Although the majority of Labour members could agree
on such adm irable and lofty goals as full employment, social and economic equality, and
the elim ination of poverty, few could agree on how to achieve them . As different
individual priorities em erged, m em bers began to fight it out in the arenas of the media
and the annual conference.
Throughout this study, the fact that has continually resurfaced is that most of
Labour's problems resulted from the absence of a well-defined ideology . Nowhere was
this more evident than in the debates that took place within the party over entry into the
E u ro p ean

C om m unity

(E C ).

M any

im portant econom ic argum ents w ere

put forth

concerning such "Socialist" objectives as the creation of jobs, economic controls, and
breaking down barriers to trade, but it was primarily

ideological argum ents that

p revailed on the EEC isuue, argum ents provoked in large part by the absence of a
consensus on Socialism itself.
Socialist goals often cam e into direct conflict during debates on Common Market
entry,

mainly due to the party's ideological vagueness. For exam ple, some ideologues

claim ed that the true "Socialist" must at all times be an "internationalist," and that
therefore the Labour Party should take Britain into the EEC where she could join her
"Socialist" allies in the fight for social and economic equality. Other ideologues argued
that becau se "Socialism" advocates governm ent control, going into a Europe, where
Britain would lose her sovereignty to a higher European authority, should be considered
"anti-Socialist." As the debates intensified they becam e reminiscent of past arguments
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over such foreign policy decisions as unilateral disarm am ent and facism in Spain when
the m eaning of Socialism was also questioned. T here was, however, a difference that
appeared in the debate over the issue of EEC entry. Although the debates on past foreign
policy issues had previously reflected a traditional ideological left-right division, the
split that occurred in the party over the Common M arket question w as not so clear-cut.
The ideologues fought on both sides, giving weight to the argum ent that not only was
there a split between left and right, but also there was no consensus among Labour's left
on w hat the party's official stance should be on the issue. This inherent problem of
confusion and dissent can be traced back to Labour's ideological vacuity.
In the end, Harold Wilson decided that a national referendum would be the best
solution to the problem of party unity because not only would it settle the issue of entry
once and for all, it would also m ake the Labour Party appear more democratic. From this
evidence, it can be concluded that the split that developed in the Labour Party over the
question of Britain's entry into the EEC is not distinctly representative of the traditional
ideological split within the party.
As 1992 approaches, it will be interesting to see how the party reacts to being a
m em ber of the Single M arket, particularly if Labour assum es power. Recent party
statements and policy reports have called for Labour to "meet the challenge and make the
change" in Europe in the 1990's. The party proposes to focus on overcom ing the
barriers which divide East and W est and to move towards a new relationship which will
bring together the whole of Europe. It also proposes to give a strong priority to social
and regional concerns and to the promotion of actions by the EC to deal with the problems
in the Third W orld. Most importantly, the party wishes to concentrate on three EEC
issues in the near future: enlargem ent of the Community, trans-European political co-

84

operation, and the developm ent of accountable, more democratic European Community
institutions (i.e. Council of Ministers, European Parliam ent). To the Labour Party of
the 1990's, this is the socialist vision of the European Community.
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